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ABSTRACT 
In 2004, the Dominican Republic joined the CAFTA negotiations, which had 
been started between the nations of Central America and the U.S.  For the DR, this was a 
major step toward permanently opening up its domestic market and securing access to the 
markets of the other member nations.  The main question that can be asked is, why would 
a small country like the DR choose to enter into a free trade agreement?  Although it is 
possible to only look at the reasoning behind the specific decision, it is just as important 
to understand the domestic and international pressures the DR experienced over the last 
35 years that influenced the preference.  This thesis will examine the DR’s choice 
through the overall framework of regionalization and how that influenced a proliferation 
of preferential trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere.  The DR’s 
economy has always been closely linked to the U.S.’s influence and policies, and specific 
changes in the global economic climate drove both nations to seek strategic partnerships 
with each other.  The DR has had to make major adjustments to take advantage of 
potential economic opportunities, and this thesis concludes that the DR-CAFTA can be 
seen as a continuation of those efforts.  
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I. THESIS OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, after several years of negotiations with Congress, the business sector, 
and other important players on the national stage, the Dominican Republic (DR) had 
implemented all the requirements needed to conform to the provisions of the Dominican 
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).  For the DR and the 
Central American (CA) nations that had agreed to join in the agreement, this was a 
significant step in trying to link their economies to the ever-increasingly globalized 
market.  For the countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
and the Dominican Republic, the new accord with the U.S. was intended to eliminate 
tariffs and trade barriers and expand regional opportunities for the workers, 
manufacturers, consumers, farmers, ranchers and service providers in all the countries.1  
Although each nation had their reasons for joining the concerted effort, the central theme 
investigated throughout this thesis will be the DR’s specific motivation for entering into 
the preferential trade agreement/arrangement (PTA).2  
The focus of the proposed thesis will be to analyze why the DR was incorporated 
into the CAFTA process that was started in 2003.  Did the U.S. initiate the inclusion, or 
did the DR want to be part of the collective agreement before it lost any of the 
comparative advantages it has managed to gain up to that time?  In the end and through 
numerous difficulties, the DR accepted, ratified, and implemented the terms of the 
CAFTA provisions, but it is important to look at the path the nation took to arrive at that 
conclusion.  The main research question that will be answered is what were the major 
reasons that prompted the DR to join the DR-CAFTA?  It is also be important to look at a 
series of secondary questions that will help answer the primary question.  What are the 
                                                 
1 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, DR-CAFTA Final Text, 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
(accessed May 28, 2009).    
2 Preferential Trade Agreements or Arrangements (PTAs) are sometimes grouped together as regional 
integration agreements.  PTAs in this thesis can refer to a combination of free trade areas (FTAs), customs 
unions, common markets, and economic unions. 
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advantages and disadvantages of the DR entering in this agreement?  What were the 
difficulties faced by the DR in meeting the provisions of the agreement?  What  
challenges will be faced in order for the nation to take advantage of the new 
opportunities?  What path did the DR take in preparation to join the PTA?  Was the DR-
CAFTA signed under the context of a broader type of integration effort?  Will the DR-
CAFTA ultimately improve the overall economic conditions of the DR? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The research question is important, because it will provide insight into what the 
circumstances and conditions were that induced a small country like the DR to open itself 
up to free markets and trade.  The obvious expectation of open markets is that 
unrestricted competition will result in increased efficiency, while producing competitive 
products and services that help the economy to grow.  It is important to understand, from 
an economic standpoint, what the DR and similar nations hope to gain when they join 
comparable agreements.  Although economic issues are the main focus of PTAs, they 
also have the ability to influence others parts of the national structure such as labor 
practices, laws, and institutions.  It is important to determine where those changes occur.  
It is also possible to take the case of the DR and look at some of the issues that can result 
when other nations choose to enter into similar PTAs.  The insight can be very valuable 
in light of the proliferation of PTAs over the last two decades.  
During the mid 1990s, the U.S. and many Latin American nations started to look 
at the idea of establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was a 
proposed agreement to reduce and eliminate tariffs throughout the entire Western 
Hemisphere.  In many ways the concept of the FTAA was a natural extension of the 
liberal economic and stabilization policies that were instituted throughout Latin America 
in the late 1980s.  The period before the reforms was characterized by a lack of 
bureaucratic competence, extractive capacity, international backing, and control of 
economic affairs; Latin American nations were looking for new ways to energize their 
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economies, and free trade and open markets provided an alternative economic path.3  
Many advocates of the FTAA looked at the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which opened up the markets of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, as the initial 
starting block to economic transformation.  Many proponents of the Washington 
Consensus believed that similar PTAs like the NAFTA could enable the poorer nations of 
the hemisphere to close the gap between the rich and poor.4  
Unfortunately, a model similar to the European Union (EU) was a huge 
undertaking, and the motivation for the type of integration between what some 
considered the developed north and the developing south has not come close to becoming 
a reality.  What has developed under the break down of the failed FTAA construct is a 
series of PTAs between the U.S. and various nations, either on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis, that are intended to build trading blocks within the region. 5  It was under this 
construct that the DR started to talk to the nations of the Central America Common 
Market (CACM) and the U.S.  One of the agreements that came to fruition in the race for 
trading blocks was the DR-CAFTA, which was signed on August 5, 2004.  As with any 
negotiation there were numerous concessions made by both parties, but in the case of 
joining the CAFTA, the Dominican leadership must have perceived that the advantages 
would outweigh the negative effects.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
In conducting this research as to why the DR entered into the CAFTA, there will 
be several issues and problems presented.  First it is important to understand the 
structures and problems associated with the DR’s economy.  The 1970s are a good 
starting point, because the DR’s economy faced specific difficulties related to the 
country’s inability to service its debt; these difficulties led the nation to conduct major 
structural adjustments in order to adjust to the changing global conditions.6  Many of the 
                                                 
3 Jorge Dominguez and Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, 
2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 2003), 80.   
4 Moises Naim, “Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion,” Foreign Policy 118, (2000): 93.  
5 Michael Reid, The Forgotten Continent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 296.  
6 John T. Cuddington and Carlos Asili, “Fiscal Policy, the Current Account and External Debt Problem 
in the Dominican Republic,” Journal of Latin American Studies 22,  no. 2 (May 1990): 350.  
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issues encountered were part of legacy systems that dated as far back as the Gen. Rafael 
Trujillo Era, which lasted from 1930 to 1961.  The DR also experienced a fundamental 
economic shift from the dominance of the traditional agricultural exports, such as sugar, 
coffee, cocoa, and tobacco, to a more diversified economy that expanded due to tourism 
and free-trade zones (FTZs).7  The latter shift helped to produce rapid economic growth 
during the 1990s, but it also exposed the nation to global trends.  Economic growth was 
also aided by a major increase in other factors such as remittances and several market 
friendly economic reforms enacted by President Leonel Fernández in the late 1990s.8    
One of the major sectors within the FTZs that experienced growth, but also faced 
significant problems, was the apparel industry.  The U.S. and the eventual DR-CAFTA 
nations started a unique relationship during the 1980s with the passage of the Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA).  The U.S. encouraged growth in light 
manufacturing, especially in apparels that used components and textiles originating in the 
U.S.  As part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) the exports were eligible for 
unilateral preferential treatment, and this helped to establish a strategic partnership 
between the Caribbean nations and the U.S.  The initiative was not only intended to help 
the Caribbean economies, but also was a response to similar PTAs that were springing up 
all over Asia.  Asian countries, especially China, started to take a significant portion of 
international and U.S. textile and apparel business.9  The DR’s FTZs also started to come 
under increased competitive pressure in the late 1990s from Central America and China. 
It was during this time that the DR had to start looking for different ways to maintain any 
comparative advantage it had, especially after the expiration of global textile quotas on 
December 31, 2004.  The removal of textile and apparel quotas caused many companies 
to shift production from the DR to nations with cheaper wages and more efficient 
production practices, such as China.  It is expected that the DR-CAFTA will provide the 
                                                 
7 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Country Studies: Dominican Republic, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dotoc.html (accessed June 8, 2009). 
8  Claire M. Ribando, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Dominican Republic: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations with the United States, 
April 17, 2007, 4. 
9 J.F. Hornbeck, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, The Dominican Republic-Central 
America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), January 3, 2005, 5. 
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conditions that will help the country maintain a good portion of its current apparel 
business and attract further foreign direct investment (FDI).10 
Another major problem the DR faced was a major economic crisis from 2003-
2004.  This was caused by the combination of a banking scandal and mismanagement 
during the administration of President Hipólito Mejía.  During that period the government 
decided to bailout the nation’s third largest bank, Banco Intercontinental (Baninter), 
which had collapsed due to weak banking regulations, embezzlement, and fraudulent 
accounting.  The government’s decision proved to be a costly one that set off a chain of 
events that caused two other banks to collapse.  It also led to the devaluation of the 
Dominican peso (DOP), the doubling of their external debt, and a loss of 20% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP).  Pres. Mejía’s government was forced to sign two 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements during a two-year period, which 
eventually amounted to US$670 million and was used to strengthen the Central Bank’s 
reserve position and balance of payments.  For the DR the crisis was a major setback, but 
it forced the government to improve supervisory practices and to strengthen the 
regulatory framework, which included the adoption of consolidated accounting and 
supervision.11  These reforms have paved the way for the gradual restoration of much 
needed public and international confidence in the financial sector, which will be essential 
if the DR is to take advantage of the benefits of the DR-CAFTA.     
Lastly, it is important to look at the difficulties faced by the DR during the 
negotiations of the treaty and the challenges faced by the country in order to come into 
compliance with the provisions.  During the initial negotiations, one of the major issues 
that the DR faced was how to protect itself from imported U.S. beverages that contained 
high fructose corn syrup.  Many Dominican farmers involved in the sugar industry were 
concerned that dropping the tax on the imported drinks could result in severe losses in the 
                                                 
10 Claire M. Ribando, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Dominican Republic: Political and Economic Conditions and Relations with the United States, 
April 17, 2007, 4. 
11 Jules Stewart, “Dominican Republic- Back in the Black, ” The Banker , September 1, 2007.  
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local market.12  Although the PTA didn’t face as much controversy as it did in Costa 
Rica and Guatemala, there were several problems during the implementation phase.  The 
Dominican Congress was able to ratify the treaty in September 2005, but meeting all the 
necessary conditions took until March 1, 2007.  Some observers indicated that the DR 
government was trying to get exemptions related to special interest groups, while the 
Ministry of Trade spokesperson claimed the U.S. was being too strict in interpreting 
certain provisions.13    
In looking at the preliminary data there is good reason to believe the leaders of the 
DR became convinced that the only way the country could maintain continued levels of 
growth was to integrate it into the regional shift that was occurring.  Joining the CAFTA 
negotiations allowed the nation to permanently secure access to the main market where 
its exports were already going.  The U.S. is by far the DR’s biggest trading partner, and 
logical or not, this seemed to be the only guarantee for economic growth.  The DR was 
already feeling the negative effects of growing competition, even from its CA 
counterparts, and they understood that delaying an entry into a subregional PTA would 
negatively affect any preferential treatment of its products and services into the U.S.  It 
might have been possible to negotiate a stand-alone PTA with the U.S., but the DR-
CAFTA also gave the DR greater access to the CA markets.  The DR had already had its 
own agreement with the CACM nations, but single bilateral treaties would have restricted 
certain trade flows.  A possible hypothesis is that the DR weighed the consequences of 
being left out of the negotiations, and realized it had to join the PTA or face major losses 
and shifts of FDI and jobs to other nations including the CAFTA signatories.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In an attempt to understand the specifics related to the DR’s inclusion into the 
DR-CAFTA, it is valuable to step back and examine the literature related to the previous 
factors, agreements, and conditions that lead to the DR’s decision to join the PTA.  First, 
                                                 
12 Tania Polanco, “EEUU rechaza impuesto de Republica Dominicana a bebidas edulcoradas,” El 
Nuevo Día, December 6, 2004.  
13 John McCarthy, “Dominican Republic: Free Trade-Dismantling Barriers,” Foreign Direct 
Investment, February 2007.  
 7
it is helpful to examine the proposed FTAA initiative and the conditions that led to the 
formation of individual and subregional PTAs.  Second, an exploration of the DR and its 
specific links to the CACM, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the CBI gives 
good insight as to the process of trade integration in the Caribbean Basin.  It is important 
to get a sense of how trade and preferential treatment status started to develop in the 
Caribbean Basin in order fit the DR into the overall framework on which it stands today.  
Next, it is important to clarify the DR’s economic transition since the 1970s, and the 
problems it has faced along the way.  This includes the issues it faced to become eligible 
for the DR-CAFTA status.  Lastly, the research will look at the literature that considers 
the potential expectations and consequences of the FTA on the DR.  
In an attempt to understand the numerous FTAs that exist in the Western 
Hemisphere, like the DR-CAFTA, several authors have looked at overall trade 
integration throughout the Americas.  Patrice Franko and M. Angeles Villarreal have 
come to the conclusion that Latin America’s overall quest for development during the last 
20 years has taken a path from the inward-looking approach to an outwardly oriented 
model.  Initially nations began opening their trade and markets as a major part of the 
structural reform process that began in the 1980s.  The Latin America nations began the 
transition process unilaterally, but by the mid 1990s many countries began to take a more 
regional approach to liberalization.  Franko and Angles Villarreal believe that the 
regional approach allowed countries to achieve economies of scales, while giving them 
the ability to attain more than what was possible at the unilateral and multilateral levels.14   
The major question of integration during the mid 1990s was whether the 
established subregional and bilateral agreements could be the building blocks of an 
overall regional agreement?  When the original FTAA trade talks were started in 1998, it 
was perceived that the previous agreements could be used to build on and complement 
the entire process.  Franko agrees that some felt that this was a good approach, and the 
MERCOSUR (The Southern Common Market) nations, led by Brazil, took the position 
                                                 
14 Patrice Franko, The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development (Lanham: Rowan & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), 236. 
M. Angeles Villarreal, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research 
Service, Trade Integration in the Americas, November 22, 2005, 4. 
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that markets should be opened gradually, while allowing nations to build up import-
competing business.15  Franko also presents a negative aspect that states subregional 
blocks can be trade diverting.  Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen agree with 
Franko’s observation, but frame the argument with the complications that have come 
about from multiple and overlapping agreements.  The latter authors feel that PTAs can 
introduce policy friction that increases trading and transaction costs to nations dealing on 
two or more PTA fronts simultaneously.16  Estevadeordal and Suominen believe that the 
PTAs have the ability to serve as building blocks for the FTAA, if they are designed on 
the basis of the NAFTA model and if the rules of origins of each treaty can be 
harmonized based on establishing a hemispheric cumulation zone.17   
Many of the more recently established PTAs, like DR-CAFTA, have used the 
NAFTA as their reference point, and it is hoped that they will provide the blueprint of the 
potential FTAA.  Emilio Pantojas García believes that the announcement of the FTAA 
created a push in the entire hemisphere to liberalize bilateral and regional trade and 
accelerated the integration process of established entities like the CARICOM and CACM.  
He also notes that although advances on the economic front were made, there were major 
problems on the political level, which have prevented regional integration from becoming 
a reality.18  Michael Reid criticizes the PTAs claiming that they are just preferential 
deals, and many Latin American nations are settling for third best trading options.  Reid 
also states that a PTA like DR-CAFTA is far less beneficial than a global trade deal, and 
he agrees in MERCOSUR’s perspective that a united Latin America in the FTAA would 
have more bargaining power with the U.S.19  As of 2005 there was a major rift between 
the 34 nations that wanted the FTAA negotiations to resume and the five nations that 
refused, which included the MERCOSUR nations and Venezuela.  What has occurred in 
                                                 
15 Patrice Franko, The Puzzle of Latin American Economic Development (Lanham: Rowan & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), 273. 
16 Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen, “Rules of Origin in Preferential Trading Arrangements: 
Is All Well With the Spaghetti Bowl in the Americas?” Economía 5, no. 2 (2005): 64.  
17 Ibid., 87 & 91. 
18 Emilio Pantojas Garcia, “Economic Integration and Caribbean Identity: Convergences and 
Divergences,” Caribbean Studies 36, no. 1 (2008): 61.  
19 Michael Reid, The Forgotten Continent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 297. 
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parallel to the unsuccessful talks has been the proliferation of blocks of PTAs among the 
participating nations.  Many of the smaller nations and Mexico, each with strong 
connections to the U.S. market, resorted to establishing PTAs that would secure 
permanent markets for their exports and services in the face of global competition.  
Although the FTAA would have culminated into a major regional trading entity, 
this was not the first attempt by nations in the hemisphere to try to integrate into regional 
groupings.  Pantojas Garcia notes that several efforts such as the CACM, the CARICOM, 
and MERCOSUR were initiated before the FTAA was proposed, but it has only been in 
the last two decades that the PTAs have become operational economic units.20  The DR 
had previous PTAs with CACM, CARICOM, and the CBI, which had an influence on the 
DR’s decision to join the DR-CAFTA.  The revival of CACM in the early 1990s paved 
the way for integration for the nations of CA, but the CACM nations also decided to 
extend participation to other nations such as the DR, Panama, and Belize.  In 1997, the 
leaders of the CACM nations meet in Santo Domingo, DR, to initiate the expansion of 
the Central American integration process; it was at this meeting that the participants 
decided to create a PTA between CA and DR.21 The CA-DR FTA was the first PTA that 
the CA nations had signed with any nonmember nation, and it helped to establish 
important links to bring together the economies of the two parties. 
Victor Bulmer-Thomas states that the goal of CACM was to shift from import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) to export lead growth based on non-traditional exports, 
and the opportunities created by the agreements similar to the CA-DR FTA would be a 
step in achieving that.22  Leonardo Callejas, former president of Honduras, believes it 
was important for CA to reach out to its Caribbean neighbors in an attempt to establish 
partnerships for prosperity.  Callejas was convinced that banding together and 
implementing adjustment policies was the way that the nations of the Caribbean Basin 
                                                 
20 Emilio Pantojas Garcia, “Economic Integration and Caribbean Identity: Convergences and 
Divergences,” Caribbean Studies 36, no. 1 (2008): 55. 
21 Secretaría de Integración Económica Centroamericana, Declaracion De Santo Domingo, Santo 
Domingo, November 06, 1997.  
22 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, “The Central American Common Market: From Closed to Open 
Regionalism,” World Development 26, no. 2 (1998): 320.  
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could meet the emerging demands of the global economy.23  Callejas, Bulmer-Thomas, 
and a source from the Economist were also aware of the potential challenges that other 
PTAs such as NAFTA would have, especially with Mexico’s ability to attract new trade 
and investment.  The latter group believed that is was necessary to establish a bridging 
mechanism for the countries involved in CACM and the CBI in order to maintain the 
positive economic and political trends that started to take place in the 1990s.24  
 At the same time the DR was attempting to open up trade with CA, it also 
embarked on another initiative to gain access to the markets in CARICOM.  In August of 
1998 the DR signed a FTA with the CARICOM nations that would eventually come into 
force in 2001.  The Secretariat of CARICOM specifically stated that globalization 
required fundamental changes in the economies and the development process of the 
Caribbean Region and increased the risk of marginalization for smaller and vulnerable 
economies.25  The leaders of the DR hoped that the PTA would “help integrate the 
economies of the Caribbean Basin with the DR acting a bridge between CA and the 
Caribbean.”26  The signing of the DR-CARICOM FTA helped bring the Caribbean 
nations together.  Winston Griffith argued that during the early 1990s the DR was a 
global platform that created intense competition for the CARICOM nations.  Griffith 
emphasized the DR’s attractiveness due to its cheap labor and its relatively inexpensive 
space in the FTZs; this comparative advantage was believed to be the cause of 
CARICOM not being able to take full advantage of the CBI. 27   
 Interesting enough, the DR has been an observer of CARICOM since 1982 and had 
formally requested full membership into the bloc in 1991 and 2005.  Sir Ronald Sanders 
believed that in 2005, CARICOM needed to consolidate their own internal economic 
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arrangements, which would allow them to increase their competitive capacity.  This was 
of extreme importance since CARICOM was in the process of establishing a Caribbean 
Single Market and Economy (CSME).  The addition of any new members could 
complicate CARICOM’s goals.  Sanders also expressed apprehension about opening 
CARICOM to the DR’s much larger market, which could potentially produce an 
overwhelming effect if not done gradually.28  In 2008 Federico Cuello Camilo, DR 
ambassador to the EU, stated the DR was no longer interested in pursuing membership 
status in light of the DR-CARICOM FTA implementation record.  Cuello Camilo told 
reporters that the DR would prefer to work with the mechanisms that were in place and 
work on further improvements.29   
 Although the DR and the Caribbean nations have worked hard to improve their 
economies, one of the major economic impacts that helped transform many of the nations 
has been the U.S.’s interest in the region through the CBI.  Anthony Payne concludes that 
by using the CBI, the U.S. used a policy of “carrot and stick” with the Caribbean nations. 
The carrot was a nonreciprocal trade and aid program, and the stick was the structural 
adjustment packages imposed by the IMF and World Bank.  For many of the countries 
facing major crises created by declining primary exports, lower number of tourists, 
balance of payments, and debt, there was no alternative but to accept the economic 
incentive.30    
 Griffith takes the general view that many CBI nations have achieved limited 
success is as a result of the detrimental internal conditions that existed in the nations 
themselves.  Griffith observes that the DR was able to take advantage of the opportunities 
and by 1990 had become the world’s largest non-Asian supplier of apparels to the U.S. 
market.  The author notes the conditions that made the DR attractive to (FDI) in 
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comparison to other CBI beneficiaries.31  Herbert Jacobson’s argument also presents the 
issues that have led to marginal advance, and emphasizes that the CARICOM’s internal 
markets are too small to produce large quantities of any particular product, which could 
result in reduced overhead costs.32  William Corbett Jr. takes the viewpoint that although 
the CBI was presented as a way for the Caribbean nations to achieve economic health; 
the reality was that free trade was the U.S.’s ultimate objective.  Corbett believes that 
CBI was a wasted opportunity for the U.S. to genuinely help the in the economic 
revitalization of the Caribbean area due to several of the U.S.’s incorrect underlying 
assumptions and protectionism.  He also acknowledges that many of the CBI 
beneficiaries started to feel the erosion of their comparative advantages when the NAFTA 
was enacted.33  The latter condition would only worsen after the mid 1990s with the 
increased global competition, as the nations of the Caribbean would have to come up 
with different solutions to keep with the global demands.  
 In looking at the DR-CAFTA there are several sources that provide insight as to 
how the PTA was initiated and the issues surrounding it.  J.F Hornbeck provides two 
important documents that explain U.S. trade relations with the DR and CA, a review of 
the major sectors and issues of the PTA, and an outlook for the PTA.  Hornbeck 
understood that the DR-CAFTA was controversial to several sectors of the nations’ 
economies and notes how labor rights issues in some of the Latin American nations 
caused organized labor to protest the agreement.  Hornbeck looks at how the PTA 
changed the framework from the unilateral CBI to the compromises reached with the 
bilateral agreement.  He does take the view that DR-CAFTA is a comprehensive and 
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innovative agreement that melds the interests of U.S. with the Latin American nations.34  
The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) put together an educational briefing 
package from eight organizations covering DR-CAFTA subjects that range from 
transparency and participation in the negotiations to lessons learned from the NAFTA.  
The overall premise of the package is to determine if the PTA was a fair deal for the 
Latin American nations by describing the key issues and perspectives that frame the 
debate.35  Another study by M. Ayhan Kose, Alessandro Rebucci, and Alfred Schipke 
looks at the macroeconomic effects of the DR-CAFTA.  The latter authors also analyze 
the implications of the agreement by looking at NAFTA, since both PTAs are based on 
common precepts.  They conclude that the PTA will play a major role in decreasing 
macroeconomic volatility in the region, while the synchronizing businesses cycles and 
increasing cyclical interdependence through trade and financial flows.  Although shocks 
originating in the U.S. will become a more prominent feature driving macroeconomic 
changes, these are expected to be less volatile than the variations that have come from the 
region.36  
 Jessica Todd, Paul Winters, and Diego Arias provide a conceptual framework that 
identifies policies and programs for the short and middle term that will help the rural 
sector attain the potential benefits of the DR-CAFTA.  For the DR-CAFTA nations, the 
eventual effects of trade liberalization will have a major impact on agriculture, which 
remains a principal activity for many people in Latin American nations.  It will be 
important for the countries to actively look for niche markets in nontraditional exports in 
order to alleviate the losses they will experience in their traditional products.  Like the 
WOLA package, it looks at the lessons learned from the NAFTA to try to provide 
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solutions to the problems that will arise.37  Michael Fielding looks at the DR-CAFTA 
through an analysis of how small and medium businesses can profit from the arrangement 
and help provide consumers in the DR and CA with more products and options.  Fielding 
believes that the opened markets, although not large, are reliable and stable.  The latter 
facts along with the streamlining of processes, lowering of costs, and increased 
transparency can lead to higher standards of living.38 
 Assessing the issues related specifically to the Dominican economy is very 
important in order to understand the circumstances that led to the signing of the DR-
CAFTA.  Frank Moya Pons takes a critical look at the negative economic policies that the 
presidents of the DR used during the 1980s.  The country faced what Moya Pons calls an 
economic dictatorship under President Joaquin Balaguer (1986-1996), who in his first 
term abandoned all the free-market principles that took place earlier in the 1980s and lead 
a major campaign to expand government control.  The economic policies led to major 
monetary chaos, inflation, debt, and rampant corruption.39  John Cuddington and Carlos 
Asilis look at the structural problems concerning fiscal policy and conclude that they 
were a major cause of the DR’s deficits during the 1980s.  The authors agree that public 
sector spending led to external borrowing, which resulted in major debt problems.  They 
conclude that more restrictive budgetary policies, and change in the archaic tax system 
would have helped the situation significantly.40  The 1990s was a period of growth and 
transformation for the DR economy, and P. Young and others outline the reforms that 
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growth.  The comprehensive IMF study shows how the DR came into alignment with the 
foreign exchange market and the steps the nation needed to implement for further trade 
liberalization and modernization.41  
 As mentioned previously, the transformation brought many changes for the 
economy, but entering the open market also caused certain problems.  The DR had to 
constantly look for ways to maintain its competitiveness.  J.F. Hornbeck explains the 
problems the DR-CAFTA nations started to face at the end of the 1990s and the effects of 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).  Hornbeck’s conclusion that the PTAs 
being negotiated became a strategic effort to preserve gains in response to what other 
countries were doing is quite valid.42  Erika Morphy believes that the PTA was 
necessary, and without it textile investment and sourcing in the region would have 
transferred to the Chinese market.  She further states that the advantages of this 
agreement will be that investment by U.S. companies and other DR-CAFTA nations will 
increase once the protection and opportunities are in place.43   
 Karen Thuermer analyzes the deep changes that the DR must make in order to 
comply with provisions of the PTA, especially in light of the loss of revenues the DR 
government will experience when import tariffs are dropped.  Thuermer presents a 
balanced report with input from many interested sectors both on the Dominican and 
American sides of the issue.  Thuermer also looks at the DR’s banking sector and the 
importance of instilling confidence in this sector, which will aid in attracting FDI and 
new business.  Her analysis was done with the background of the 2003-2004 banking 
crisis. 44  Jules Stewart also highlights the DR’s 2003-2004 economic crisis and looks at 
the recovery efforts and reforms needed to take advantage of the DR-CAFTA.  She feels 
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that the DR has come a long way, but still needs to address serious issues such as tax 
evasion, educational gaps, and the strengthening of institutions.45  The Latin Finance 
takes the stand that the DR-CAFTA will transform the economic landscape of the 
signatories for many years, and without it the region was likely to face an economic 
disaster.  The article specifically details how the PTA will accelerate the area towards 
specialization.  Each country is looking to find areas where it has specific advantages, but 
the Latin Finance states that the largest challenge the PTA will face will be the 
management of expectations.  The key the argument is that the DR-CAFTA provides 
more opportunities for the nations, but each nation has to make sure that each of its 
sectors is implementing the reforms needed to take advantage of the situation.46  Overall 
there are many sources that relate the issues the DR has faced in the past, and the 
decisions that have been made by the government and other national sectors to manage 
the dynamic economic global forces.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The main analytic approach that will be taken to answer the research question will 
be a historical study.  Looking at several PTAs such as the FTAA, CACM, CARICOM, 
and CBI, will help to assess how they changed due to internal and external factors.  Each 
organization will first be analyzed independently and then will be linked into the DR’s 
economy.  It is important to look for the crucial changes in order to find out how their 
progressions or transformations are related to the DR’s economy.  It is quite clear that the 
named entities have helped shape the DR’s posture in its attempts to link itself to larger 
regional and global market.  They all directly tie into the DR’s decision to join the DR-
CAFTA.  One of primary sources that will be used is The Devil Behind the Mirror, by 
Steven Gregory, which describes the phenomenon of globalization on the DR during the 
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first half of the current decade.  The chapter dealing with FTZs and transnational capital 
is important in understanding the economic change that occurred in the DR.47  
In comparison to the other CA nations, except Costa Rica, there was significant delay 
from the time the DR signed the treaty and the DR Congress ratified it.  There was also a 
significant time lag from when the PTA was ratified by the DR Congress and when the 
PTA went into force.  It is important to look into these gaps to determine what problems 
were faced and how they could potentially affect the nation in the future.  Overall much 
has been written about the controversial issues involving Costa Rica accepting and 
implementing the PTA, but not much outside the DR was written related to the issue.  
The DR newspapers Listín Diario and El Nacional help to bridge the mentioned gaps and 
give a good perspective from the Dominican point of view regarding the DR-CAFTA 
process worked and the its preliminary results.  Other Spanish language newspapers such 
La Nacion and El Financiero from Costa Rica and El Nuevo Día from Puerto Rico 
provide insight from a Latin American aspect.  Two other important sources that have 
been used are the IMF page and the Organization of American State’s Foreign Trade 
Information System (SICE), which centralizes information on trade policy in the 
Americas.  The SICE page is extremely useful because it provides official documentation 
relating to each county’s trade agreements.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into four chapters. Chapter I began with an 
introduction outlining the main research question followed by the any problems, issues, 
and secondary research questions that are necessary to answer the main research 
question.  A major part of Chapter I consisted of a literature review to help clarify what 
has been written related to the primary and secondary research questions, and the 
problems and issues involved with them.  This was followed by a survey of additional 
primary sources and concluded with a thesis overview.  Chapter II will be dedicated to 
looking at the potential FTAA, which is the overarching framework to which the other 
PTAs (CBI, CACM, CARICOM) are connected.  Although some of the PTAs that will be 
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discussed were established before the idea of the FTAA became concrete, they developed 
even further after the breakdown in negotiations and were supposed to be the building 
blocks of the overall regional agreement.  This chapter helps to establish the links 
between the listed PTAs and the DR, while building the foundations needed to show why 
the joining the DR-CAFTA became a logical step in the DR’s economic evolution.  It 
also focuses on the external entities that played a role in the final outcome. 
Chapter III will cover the overall transformation of the DR economy starting from 
the problems that occurred during the 1970s.  The chapter will analyze the impacts of 
restructuring and the neoliberal reforms that allowed the DR economy to grow in the 
1990s.  These same measures opened the DR up to global market forces and forced the 
country to look for ways to remain competitive.  This chapter will explain the impacts 
that China, Asia, and WTO regulations have had on the light manufacturing sectors of the 
DR, CA, and the U.S.  It will also detail how the DR made attempts to establish closer 
ties to the subregional arrangements in which it was already involved.  The next major 
event examined will be the financial crisis of 2003-2004, which occurred around the 
same time the DR started to talk to the U.S. concerning a potential PTA.  It will be 
necessary to look at this event because, the steps needed to recover from the major shock 
were important to set the nation up for serious talks with the U.S. and CA.  This chapter 
is mainly focused on internal factors dealing directly with the DR’s quest to find where it 
would fit into the larger global picture.   
The final chapter will give an overview of the DR-CAFTA and then look at the 
how the negotiation process evolved for the DR.  It will outline the difficulties 
encountered during the negotiation, ratification, and implementation phases.  It will 
explore what the expected gains and losses were in the major sectors of the economy.  It 
will also be important to look into the challenges that the DR will continue to face in 
order to take full advantage of the FTA.  This chapter will also examine the preliminary 
results of the implementations in order to get some idea of how issues have evolved since 
the treaty was put into force on March of 2007.  This latter analysis will be limited to the 
first year after the enforcement, so that the current global recession does not skew the 
analysis.  
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II. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS TIES TO WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE REGIONALIZATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to understand the numerous reasons why the Dominican Republic 
(DR) joined the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) negotiations, it is 
beneficial to look at the overall framework of how regionalization and other subdivisions 
aided the trade liberalization process in the Western Hemisphere.  For the purposes of 
this study, regionalization will refer to the overall Western Hemisphere integration 
process, while subregionalization will refer to the initiatives of the smaller blocs within 
the larger region.  The DR-CAFTA is one of the latest preferential trade agreements or 
arrangements (PTAs)48 that have been signed.  It is clear also that it is the latest link in a 
chain of accords designed to open the entire region to the global economy.   
There have been multiple attempts throughout the years to achieve increased 
levels of trade cooperation in the region, but the process of integration became more 
realistic as the countries in the Americas started to seriously open up their economies to 
free trade by the 1980s.  This chapter will specifically focus on the influential PTAs to 
which the DR was connected and how those PTAs helped to guide the country down a 
path of economic evolution.  Several questions need to be answered here.  First, what 
were the origins and goals of these agreements?  Next, how did these PTAs change over 
time (with an emphasis on how they attempted to tie their products and services to the 
global market)?  What has been the relationship between the PTAs and the hoped for, but 
unrealized, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)?  Also, how did the DR become 
involved with the different PTAs, and finally to what extent did the DR establish formal 
relationships with the existing organizations?  
The overarching PTA that will be the analyzed is the FTAA initiative, which was 
initially intended to supersede and replace all other PTAs in effect.  The analysis will 
explore the origins and motives behind this enormous undertaking, as well as the 
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fundamental interpretation of how subregional blocs would fit into the grand scheme of 
the negotiations.  From there the chapter will look at the subregional PTAs in which the 
DR was involved within the Caribbean Basin, before it opted for membership in the 
CAFTA.  The latter research will include the Central America Common Market (CACM) 
and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  CACM and CARICOM were both 
originally established with similar goals in mind during the 1960s and 1970s, when 
attaining higher levels of internal industrialization was viewed as an essential part of their 
incipient developmental strategies.  The DR was not a part of CARICOM and CACM 
when they were started, but became involved with them as the blocs started to look for 
other opportunities to expand trade and connect the entire Caribbean.  Lastly, an 
examination of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) will provide significant insight into 
how the entire Caribbean Basin was affected by the unilateral PTA with the U.S.  The 
CBI can almost be seen as the underlying PTA that transformed significant portions of 
the beneficiary nations’ economies away from primary product exportation and towards 
the creation of the light-manufacturing sector.  The CBI linked the nations of the 
Caribbean more closely to the economy of the U.S., but also introduced the Caribbean 
nations to the pressures of competition from other parts of the world, particularly China 
and Asia.  
B. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) INITIATIVE  
By the end of the 1980s, major economic changes had swept across Latin 
America.  After suffering through a decade of pervasive cheating, where state and local 
actors continuously tried to evade the mounting economic crises by cheating each other 
and consuming public assets, there was a significant shift in thinking as to how economic 
stabilization could be achieved.  Many Latin American nations were left with few options 
and implemented significant market-oriented programs of economic stabilization and 
structural adjustment.49  The dominant economic model of the 1990s emphasized 
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neoliberal reform and trade fundamentalism as the key components needed for growth.50  
At the same time, and with investments in the area, the U.S. started to take a turn towards 
regionalization.  In 1990, President H.W. Bush laid out the U.S.’s new approach and 
unveiled the major concepts of the Enterprise for the Americas (EAI) that focused on the 
“three pillars,” which were trade, investment, and debt.  The key goals of the EAI were to 
promote increased economic interaction by establishing a hemispheric free trade zone, 
adopting measures to create new capital flows in the region, and taking new approaches 
towards debt that established favorable investment environments.  It was hoped the EAI 
would establish a united and democratic hemisphere with equal trading partners 
“stretching from the port of Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego.”51 
 The EAI offered a new economic vision that was full of promise, but not all 
parties concerned shared the same optimistic perspective.  Specifically, the EAI led many 
leaders in the Caribbean Basin to express justified concerns about the potential erosion of 
the preferential trade treatment that had been established by the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI).  Many contended that despite the duty-free access of many products 
from the region to the U.S., many sectors would be further disadvantaged by the open 
trade regime.52  Despite some of the negative aspects the EAI did succeed in establishing 
the foundation needed to create the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
The endeavor that the U.S., Canada, and Mexico undertook sent a strong signal to the rest 
of the region concerning the extent of commitment behind the principles of the EAI.  The 
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agreements that went beyond the original three pillars and attempted to address other 
endemic problems, such as drug-trafficking, migration, and the institution building 
needed for effective democratization.53 
 In 1994 the nations of the Western Hemisphere sought to build upon and deepen 
the thrust created by the EAI and announced the FTAA initiative at the first Summit of 
the Americas.  It was at this monumental meeting held in Miami that the leaders of the 34 
nations agreed to negotiate a Western Hemisphere free trade agreement (FTA) by 2005.  
The new initiative would fuse the PTAs that existed and would join the $13 trillion of 
services and products with its nearly 800 million inhabitants.54  Although this colossal 
undertaking would require extensive negotiations, it is evident that the expected outcome 
was an area where the rules of trade would be simplified in the long term.  Estevadeordal 
and Suominen examine the issues and complications that have come about with the 
proliferation of PTAs in the Western Hemisphere since the FTAA was initially 
announced.  They conclude that the “hemispheric PTA spree has forged a veritable 
spaghetti bowl of multiple and overlapping agreements…each PTA’s standards, 
safeguards, government procurement, and investment - entangle the bowl further.”55  The 
new PTAs, especially those modeled after NAFTA, carry rules of origin that actually 
counteract PTA inspired trade liberalization.56  By establishing the FTAA, problems and 
friction arising from overlapping and conflicting agreements will hopefully be removed, 
and products and services will be able to flow throughout the region in an more efficient 
manner.  
 The major question that came to the fore at the initial summit was what role the 
current and future subregional agreements would play in the formation of the FTAA?  It 
is important to note that under the EAI the U.S. was willing to enter into bilateral 
agreements with individual countries or groups of nations that had associated for the 
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purpose of trade liberalization.57  In a sense some of the pieces of the hemispheric 
integration puzzle were already on the board, but they had yet to be organized in a 
manner that would help create a clear overarching framework.  The initial declaration 
stated that one of it goals was to maximize market openness through high levels of 
discipline and to build upon existing agreements.58  Some nations agreed that subregional 
blocs should be the foundation of the FTAA because it would allow them to negotiate as 
bigger entities throughout the process.  The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
bloc, led by Brazil, was a strong proponent of the subregional approach and felt that trade 
liberalization should be a phased project.  MERCOSUR believed that the gradual 
approach would allow nations to take the adequate measures needed to develop import-
competing industries; this point of view would later morph with other factors and develop 
into a strategy that would seek to gain leverage during subsequent summit meetings.  The 
U.S. sought to open trade with any democratic nation willing to do so and saw 
subregional and bilateral PTAs as a way to achieve greater liberalization and address 
issues not dealt with at the World Trade Organization (WTO) through the Doha 
Agenda.59 
 After several preliminary ministerial meetings that were used to examine the 
existing trade related measures and to establish the structure of negotiations, the formal 
process of creating the FTAA was initiated in April of 1998.  The heads of state and 
ministers agreed that the final agreement would be balanced, comprehensive, in line with 
the WTO, and instituted in a single undertaking.  It was also agreed that the process 
would be transparent and acknowledge the differences in the levels of development and 
size of the different economies so that all the nations could participate.  Importance was 
placed on the goal of raising living standards, improving working conditions, and 
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protecting the environment.60  The negotiators wanted to make concrete progress on the 
initiative by 2000, but significant development was partially prevented by the divergent 
interests that started to surface, particularly on the part of the members of MERCOSUR.  
The bloc affirmed that the consolidation of MERCOSUR, in relation to the U.S., would 
provide Latin America, as a whole, a better bargaining position during the negotiations.61  
Many of the issues that arose were due to the stalling of the Doha Round of world trade 
talks, which were supposed to liberalize trade in agriculture and eliminate subsidies for 
agricultural products.  The U.S. insisted that it would not eliminate subsidies on a 
regional basis and would wait until a global agreement was reached; the South American 
nations, on the other hand, felt that the continued subsidies would provide the U.S. an 
unfair advantage in their markets, especially if the goal was to create a free trade zone.62 
 Another concern that started to resonate within the FTAA negotiations was that of 
which nations would be the leaders and take representative stands on issues throughout 
the complicated procedure?  Although all the participating nations would be allowed to 
raise issues and contribute, it was almost inevitable that the economic and political giants 
of the hemisphere would rise to take their place within the structure.  In the course of 
time, the leading actors would become the U.S. and Brazil, with Venezuela exerting 
particular pressure during the latter parts of the talks.  Under President Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva, Brazil’s external policies took a different turn, and starting in 2002 it 
demonstrated its desire to be seen not only as a regional power, but a global player as 
well.  Many Brazilian diplomats went as far as to reject the entire FTAA initiative in 
favor a South American bloc that would be led by the increasingly important nation.63 
In 2003 as the negotiations continued to stall, Brazil and the U.S. made a 
compromise on a two tier FTAA structure, dubbed FTAA-Lite.  The compromise would 
establish a common set of rights and obligations for all the nations on the first tier.  The 
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second tier would consist of a series of multilateral agreements in which the individual 
countries would voluntarily commit to make progress to achieve deeper disciplines and 
liberalization.  Yet even with this new framework, the differences between the U.S. 
backed side on the one hand and the MERCOSUR bloc on the other hand, concerns over 
which areas would fall within each tier were not reconciled.  The negotiations came to a 
complete halt in 2004 as the MERCOSUR block and Venezuela refused to continue the 
process.64 
 The breakdown sparked significant anti-FTAA momentum, both in the U.S. and 
in Latin America.  Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez brought a new dimension to the 
discord.  He actively promised to bury the FTAA and championed his own continental 
alliance known as the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ALBA).  Although a further attempt was made to revive the FTAA initiative during a 
fourth Summit of the Americas held in Mar del Plata in November 2005, it was clear that 
the rift between the opposing sides had continued to grow.  According to MERCOSUR 
and Venezuela, talks would not resume until the “necessary conditions” were met.65  In 
the U.S. the FTAA also caused backlash from anti-globalization protestors and union 
activists who feared jobs would move to other areas, but the U.S.’s official stance to open 
up markets continued to march forward.66 
It was evident by 2006 that the hemisphere was divided into two camps, but that 
didn’t stop other initiatives from successfully occurring in parallel to the FTAA 
negotiations.  Although the FTAA appeared to have been dying a slow and painful death, 
Mexico, Central America, the DR, and Chile made a commitment to open trade and 
investment by signing PTAs with the U.S. and with each other.  Other countries like 
Colombia and Peru were also making serious attempts to access the U.S. market by 
entering into bilateral negotiations.67  As global pressures on trade and investment 
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increased, the smaller countries like the DR, who understood their positions and had 
economies with strong orientations towards the U.S. market, needed to lock in future 
opportunities.  They simply could not afford to be held back by the interests of the larger 
South American nations that had more choices.  The irony behind the overall breakdown 
was that MERCOSUR, which had expressed its need for solidarity and consolidations, 
was also experiencing internal rifts.  The fissure became quite apparent when Uruguay 
announced its intentions to seek a PTA with the U.S.68  
C. THE CENTRAL AMERICA COMMON MARKET (CACM) 
Although the FTAA has made a significant attempt to integrate trade throughout 
the entire hemisphere, other smaller efforts to form trading blocs have taken place in the 
20th century.  In Latin America regional integration began with the CACM in 1960 and 
was followed in the 1960s and 1970s by the Latin American Free Trade Association, the 
Andean Pact, and CARICOM.  What is important to comprehend is that it has only been 
in the last two decades that the economic and trade agreements have started to function as 
more effective and operational units.  The main driving forces that have allowed the 
agreements to advance have been the pressures of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the FTAA.  This has certainly been the case for the CACM and CARICOM.69  
During the initial stages of integration, the schemes’ primary goal was to increase trade 
through selective preferences, especially in manufacturing; the organizations sought to 
enlarge their markets through protective markets and import substitution industrialization 
(ISI).70  
 In an attempt to emulate the European Economic Community (EEC), the Central 
American republics set out to form the first customs union in Latin America.  The 
founders of CACM hoped that the customs union would reduce the region’s dependence 
on the external sector, improve the net barter trade, and achieve industrialization.  
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Through rapid industrialization and the mutual sharing of the net benefits, it was expected 
that the area would raise incomes and lower reliance on the rest of the world.  
Industrialization was achieved to large extent by freeing trade in the region and 
establishing a common external tariff (CET) on third countries. 71   
During the first decade, the CACM experienced substantial growth with its newly 
established model.  People within the member nations and the international community 
recognized the achievements, which included an impressive eight-fold increase in 
intraregional trade from 1960-1968.  Economic analysis demonstrated overall statistical 
and dynamic growth for the region, but unequal growth and development patterns started 
to emerge in certain sectors and in the poorer nations of the bloc.72  Honduras was 
particularly strained, as it failed to attract new investments in the manufacturing sector, 
was forced to pay monetary penalties for compensation, and saw a continual deterioration 
in the net barter terms of trade.  Conditions became so unfavorable for Honduras that it 
opted to leave the tariff union in 1970, and its departure signaled the beginning of the 
demise of the original CACM.  Unequal growth throughout the region, fiscal revenue 
losses caused by the duty-free intraregional imports, and easily saturated markets that 
prevented optimal production levels all combined to undermine the hopes of achieving a 
common market.73   
Although during the 1970s interregional and external trade continued to expand, 
the CACM lost the dynamism that had helped fuel it during the first decade.  One 
significant change was that traditional primary export products overtook the 
manufacturing sector as the catalyst of growth.  Ironically, the latter was what the region 
was originally trying to move away from.  Secondly, the region started to experience 
significant political changes related to the crumbling of the Somoza government in 
Nicaragua and the gains made by leftist parties in El Salvador.74  The final forces that 
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swelled to break CACM’s integration vision were the combination of the drop in value of 
extraregional exports due to the 1982 Latin American debt crisis, the consequent 
restructuring and stabilization programs, and the civil wars and unrest that enveloped 
large portions of the region.  By 1986 the combination of effects had also taken its toll on 
intraregional trade, which had been halved and accounted for only 15% of the total 
trade.75  It was clear by the mid 1980s that the initiative had come to an unfortunate halt 
and would not be reinvigorated until the political and economic landscape had been 
settled and could provide a new and realistic premise for growth.  
The early 1990s ushered in a more stable political and economic era for Central 
America (CA) as the regional peace process was being implemented and the nations 
moved away from protectionism and low value added primary goods exports.  A new 
emphasis was placed on trying to unite the region through export led growth in 
nontraditional products and trade liberalization.  The CA nations realized that integration 
would allow them to exploit economies of scale, and they received important backing 
from the business sector and civil society.76  As Rafael Callejas, former president of 
Honduras stated, “the demands of the competing in the global economy have prompted 
the Central American countries to abandon the state-dominated, protectionist economic 
models of the past in favor of free markets, free trade, and open investment.”77  It was 
this turn towards a different model for economic growth that would help set the 
foundations for the DR-CAFTA.  The drive towards economic integration was codified 
with the signing of the Protocol of the Tegucigalpa in 1991 that created the Central 
America Integration System (SICA).  The SICA established a new legal and institutional 
framework for the regional integration process, and helped pave the way for updating the 
outdated CACM agreement.78   
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Another important aspect of the SICA was that it also looked to expand its 
membership and association with the other nations of the region.  As the Central 
American nations were looking to integrate themselves into the global community, they 
reached out to their Caribbean neighbors to seek the establishment of a partnership for 
prosperity.79  The inclusion of neighboring nations can be viewed in a grander scheme as 
a natural extension of the transformation process from inward to outward looking growth.  
The expansion process was initiated at the III Extraordinary Meeting of Presidents of 
Central America held in Santo Domingo, DR, in 1997, where Belize, Panama, and the 
DR signed a Declaration and Framework Cooperation Agreement with the original SICA 
members.  For the DR, which at the time was seeking to cement opportunities in new 
markets, the stipulations in paragraph eleven were of particular interest because they 
expressed the intent to establish a FTA between CA and the DR.80  
The negotiation process of the CA-DR FTA was aimed at liberalizing tariffs on 
goods, services, and investments to the maximum extent possible, with certain justified 
exceptions.81  What was important for all the nations involved, however, was that their 
leaders recognized that the challenges presented by the new world order could be better 
faced with a united front.  The new challenges required closer ties and cooperation in 
order to prevent the demands created by globalization from stunting potential growth and 
to allow the citizenry to achieve acceptable living standards.82  Individually it would 
have been impossible for the small nations to maintain the comparative advantages that 
they had achieved, especially in building increased growth in the U.S. market.  The CA-
DR FTA was a modern, third generation PTA patterned in the NAFTA fashion that was 
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specifically designed to fit into the mold of the FTAA framework.  By creating the FTA, 
the nations created an open market that could integrate the $50 billion already being 
generated in the space and unite over 40 million potential consumers.83  
 For both the DR and CACM, this PTA was the first of its kind signed by either 
party and would set the stage to bring the nations closer to each other during the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  The negotiations between the CACM nations and the DR also set 
a precedent for intra-regional trade cooperation in trade negotiation, and would prove to 
be vital once the nations started to negotiate the DR-CAFTA.84  It is important to note 
that although the treaty was negotiated and signed as a whole, each CA nation had its 
own set of guidelines and obligations to which it had to conform vis-à-vis the DR.85  The 
latter arrangement would eventually create greater efficiency when all the nations started 
to negotiate the DR-CAFTA.  Since it would not be necessary for the Caribbean nations 
to negotiate amongst each other, they would be able to present a united bloc in the 
negotiation process with the U.S.  The CA-DR FTA was signed by all nations on the 
November 28, 1998, and went into effect after the Dominican Congress approved it and 
El Salvador ratified it on October 3, 2001.86  
D. THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) 
At the same time that the DR and the CACM were attempting to establish closer 
ties, the DR also reached out to its other Caribbean neighbors by pursing negotiations 
with the nations of the CARICOM.  The DR had previously expressed interest in opening 
trade with the CARICOM and was granted observer status in 1982.  The DR had also 
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applied for full membership status in 1991, but at the time the CARICOM failed to 
respond to the official request.87  In August of 1998, the DR signed an FTA with the 
CARICOM that would come into force in 2001, but in many ways the road towards 
achieving this PTA was not as smooth as the CA-DR FTA.88  The issues behind 
achieving closer relations and trade between the DR and the CARICOM nations, perhaps, 
can be found in the nature of CARICOM’s organization and history.  
 The CARICOM was originally established in 1973 as an attempt to achieve 
economic integration through a customs union and policy and functional cooperation, for 
the former British territories.89  The attempt to foster collective economic growth was a 
new trajectory for the island nations that since colonial times had produced similar 
commodities and were positioned to compete for the same markets and investments.90  
This fact was initially reflected in CARICOM’s initial English-speaking membership, but 
since then the organization has embraced and included other willing nations of the 
Caribbean.91  In the early 1990s, the CARICOM nations committed themselves to 
deepening regional economic integration by creating the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy (CSME).  The CSME sought to further enable the established system by 
providing full factor economic mobility and harmonization in a single space that would 
encourage regional trade, production, and investment.  What had become apparent to the 
CARICOM at the time was that the international economic environment required that the 
nations make adjustments and transform themselves to meet the new demands.92   
 Although the nations had multiple reasons that drove them to stronger integration, 
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the nations’ overriding incentive was to reduce some of the disadvantages they faced 
arising from their individual small sizes.  The CARICOM nations wanted to combine the 
factors they possessed to create economies of scale, which would allow them to increase 
productivity, diversify output, and spur growth.93  This, in turn, would allow the trade 
group to link into the FTAA initiative and the global economic system.  This belief was 
very similar to the motivation behind CACM’s desire to establish closer connections, 
which points to the possibility that smaller nations are willing to sign PTAs with similarly 
endowed nations to achieve stronger standing when entering a larger market.  The CSME 
has come a long way in the last two decades, but is not fully completed.  It is expected 
that after the full implementation of the CSME, the CARICOM nations will be able to 
move to the next phase that will extend beyond trade liberation and address common 
policies and instruments.  The CARICOM still faces serious challenges that must be 
addressed.  First, it must address the difference in country sizes, economic structures and 
policies, rates of growth, levels of development, and institutional capacities.  Then it must 
attend to the need for increased public awareness, especially among the private business 
sector.  Finally it must deal with the need to develop human resources through education 
and vocational training that establish an internationally competitive labor force.94   
 One of the important things that the CSME established in 1997 was the Caribbean 
Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which provided the mechanisms needed to 
conduct trade negotiations with third countries.  In its own attempts to link to the global 
market, the CARICOM began talks with the European Union (EU) and other nations to 
negotiate a several PTAs.95  The DR was one of the nations that was pressing hard to 
establish a PTA with the CARICOM, even after its initial attempts at full membership 
were ignored.  The DR may have been motivated to seek the CARICOM’s markets for 
various reasons of which subregionalization was certainly a major part.  For the DR and 
the CARICOM, the new PTA was expected to help all member nations prepare their 
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small economies for the eventual FTAA.  It was an attempt to gradually open up 
increasingly larger economic spaces and consolidate the resources needed to confront the 
larger hemispheric market.  The PTA was of importance to Dominican leaders because 
they considered the country to be well suited to act as the logical and natural bridge 
between the Caribbean and CA nations.96  To further subregional cooperation in 1997, 
the DR government took the proactive step of proposing a Strategic Alliance between CA 
and the Caribbean nations, which was intended to create a free trade area and strengthen 
the regional space with common positions, objectives, interests, and goals.97   
 The conflictive negotiations surrounding the DR and CARICOM with the European 
Union (EU) are another reason for the complications behind increasing geopolitics and 
the need for regional cooperation.  Sir Ronald Sanders, a former Caribbean diplomat, 
claimed that in 1998 the “CARICOM was constrained by external factors to formalize a 
relation with the DR.”98  The external factors pointed out by Sanders amounted to 
pressures from the U.S. and EU that indirectly forced the nations into signing a PTA.  
This position directly undermines any genuine intention by the DR to increase Caribbean 
integration.99  Sanders further accused the DR of trying to establish the PTA and later 
attempting to join the CARICOM in 2005 to negotiate a better position to establish a long 
term Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.100   
 Clara Quiñones, Ambassador and Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
DR, points out that when the DR decided to negotiate with the EU through the Caribbean 
Forum (CARIFORUM), it did so after numerous consultations with national and 
CARICOM leaders.  The fact that the DR used the CRNM as the negotiation mechanism 
proved that the DR was looking to establish common positions with the CARICOM 
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nations in order to further collective interests.  The establishment of the PTA was clearly 
in line with what the DR was attempting with the CACM, and the proposed Strategic 
Alliance would only have helped to consolidate the smaller economies of the Caribbean 
Basin.  As for the EPA, the DR could have tried to deal with the EU directly, which was a 
possibility that was proposed by the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
Group.101   
 Through all the controversy the DR and CARICOM were able to come to an 
agreement and establish an FTA in 1998, although full implementation has been harder to 
achieve.  When the framework of the agreement was established, the Secretariat of 
CARICOM stated that globalization required fundamental changes in the economies and 
development process of the Caribbean Region and increased the risk of marginalization 
for smaller and vulnerable economies.102  The signing of the CARICOM-DR FTA was a 
positive step taken to bring the Caribbean nations together.  Winston Griffith points out 
that during the early 1990s the DR had become a global platform that created intense 
competition for the CARICOM nations.  Griffith acknowledged the DR’s attractiveness 
due to its cheap labor and its relatively inexpensive space in the FTZs; this comparative 
advantage was believed to be the cause of CARICOM’s inability to take full advantage of 
the CBI.103  With the new CARICOM-DR FTA, it was hoped that animosities and 
mistrust, which had been building up over the previous decades, could be worked out.  
  The internal issues that the CARICOM is still trying to resolve have slowed the 
implementation of both the CARICOM-DR FTA and any further integration efforts.  The 
FTA came into force on December 1, 2001, when Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and 
Tobago completed the necessary steps to implement the agreement.  Since then only three 
nations, including the DR, have signed the PTA.104  Sanders concludes that as of 2005 
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CARICOM still needed to consolidate its internal economic arrangements, which would 
allow them to increase their competitive capacity.  Ironically, this was the same argument 
used by MERCOSUR in its initial references towards the FTAA.  The internal “house 
cleaning” was considered to be of extreme importance to CARICOM, since it was still in 
the process of establishing the CSME.  The addition of any new members, like the DR, 
was supposed to complicate CARICOM’s overall long-term goals.  Sanders also 
expressed his apprehension about opening up CARICOM to the DR’s much larger 
market, which could potentially produce an overwhelming effect on the smaller nations if 
not done gradually.105   
In 2008, Federico Cuello Camilo, DR ambassador to the EU, stated the DR was 
no longer interested in pursuing membership status in light of the DR-CARICOM FTA 
implementation record.  The DR has voiced its concerns over the implementation of any 
of the CARICOM’s PTAs and of the organization’s ability to act as the implementing 
authority for the CARIFORUM/EU EPA.  Cuello Camilo told reporters that the DR 
would prefer to work with the mechanisms that were in place and seek further 
improvements.106 
E. THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE (CBI)  
  The countries of the Caribbean have taken positive steps towards greater 
integration, and the process has produced significant changes and growth in many of the 
economic sectors of the individual nations.  Although commendable strides have been 
made to pool common resources in the area, none of the aforementioned PTAs has had 
the overall impact as the CBI.  Through the use of the CBI, the U.S.’s interests have been 
able to transform the entire nature of the area’s economic growth.  The CBI, created 
under the Reagan Administration in 1983, was a unilateral PTA that allowed Caribbean 
nations to export products to the U.S. whose previous entry had been blocked by 
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tariffs.107  The program, which was enacted through the Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act (CBERA), was a wide-ranging agreement and was intended to address the 
region’s economic woes by introducing free trade, investment incentives, and increased 
economic aid.  At the time the U.S. believed that the area’s general economic model 
needed to shift, especially in light of the negative impacts of the volatility of the world oil 
market and the declining prices of their traditional major exports such as sugar, coffee, 
and bauxite.  The overall situation was complicated by high rates of unemployment, 
declining gross national products, balance of payment deficits, and lowered tourism 
levels.108  
 The nature of the CBI changed the Caribbean’s central dynamic of development 
towards an exogenous source, i.e. the U.S., which had set a priority of creating market-
based economies capable of competing with international export markets.  Anthony 
Payne concluded that the economic revolution did not come about without any strings 
attached.  By using the CBI, the U.S. used a policy of “carrot and stick” with the 
Caribbean nations.  The carrot in this case was a nonreciprocal trade and aid program that 
helped friendly nations, while the sticks were the structural adjustment packages imposed 
by the IMF and World Bank.109  It is important to remark that the CBI had a particular 
security aspect to it, as only nations meeting strict criteria, such as being non-communist 
and fighting the flow of narcotics, were allowed to become beneficiaries.110  Thus the 
U.S. was able to mold the major aspects of the basin’s future growth.  For many of the 
countries that were facing major crises, created by the seemingly insurmountable 
problems, there was little alternative but to accept the new economic incentives.111    
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 Since the CBI’s inception, the PTA has seen numerous modifications that have 
been aimed at fixing some of the barriers preventing the beneficiaries from taking full 
advantage of the opportunities.  In some cases the CBI nations have achieved limited 
success for reasons attributed to the detrimental internal conditions that exist in the 
nations themselves.  Issues such as a non-dynamic manufacturing class, the 
unattractiveness of the smaller nations as global platforms, lack of adequate inland 
transportation, undersized port facilities, and unreliable energy sources are among the 
many problems that some of the nations needed to address.112   
 Another significant aspect that prevented progress is the difference in expectations 
between the U.S. and some of the Caribbean nations.  Tariffs were removed on many 
products; however when the CBI came into force, 87% of the basin’s products already 
entered the U.S. duty-free.  In effect the CBI only managed to have a positive impact on 
7% of the trade at the time, and it excluded the region’s most competitive export 
products, which were sugar, petroleum, and textiles.113  This was an issue that the 
Caribbean nations consistently brought up during discussions, but as Alexander Good, 
the CBI Ombudsman, points out, the CBI was not implemented to promote the major 
exports of the region.  From the U.S. point of view, the Caribbean governments needed to 
take the adequate measures to provide a local business climate that would attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and look for opportunities in nontraditional exports.114  The 
strategy called the nations to take steps to create attractive investment packages, improve 
telecommunications, build free trade zones (FTZs), and establish industrial parks.115  
Thus, there were necessary pre-conditions to meet for the developing nations to capitalize 
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on the exportation of non-traditional goods and services.  Although some nations in the 
basin fell behind in creating the proper conditions, one of the countries that quickly 
stepped up to meet the challenge was the DR.  
 In creating the proper conditions for the investments, the DR had specific 
advantages that offered firms the ability to complete globally, especially in the light 
manufacturing industry.  During the late 1980s, there was a significant global trend that 
began to take place that shifted labor-intensive manufacturing jobs to relatively low wage 
regions.  Griffith observes that Mexico, the DR, and many Asian countries were able to 
take advantage of the growing labor shift, because they had become wage competitive.  
In general the nations had become “global platforms,” because they offered a mix of 
inexpensive unskilled and skilled workers from an abundant labor pool.116  In the DR the 
majority of the export-processing industries quickly took over much of the operations 
occurring in the FTZs; this was a remarkable change from the slow start the FTZs had 
when they were first introduced to the country in 1970.117  What was certain was that by 
1990 the DR had become the world’s largest non-Asian supplier of apparel to the U.S. 
market.118  
E. CONCLUSION 
 The attempt made to foster Western Hemisphere regionalization, which started 
during the 1990s, played a major role in aligning most if not all the Latin American 
nations towards trade liberalization and open markets.  Although currently the FTAA’s 
objectives are further than ever from being reached, it is important to note the significant 
impact the initiative has had in helping to operationalize and produce smaller coalitions 
of trading units.  This is quite evident by the 43 PTAs that have been signed by Western 
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Hemisphere nations in the period between 1990 and 2005.119  Within the FTAA initiative 
it was believed that smaller trading units could be the foundation for the colossal 
undertaking; this was a common position that was advocated even by the leaders of the 
conflicting arguments, which were Brazil and the U.S.  Trading blocs, such as the CACM 
and the CARICOM realized that the models on which they had originally been built were 
no longer sustainable and had to be adjusted to the new global structure.  Due to differing 
interests and the hopes of attaining the maximum amount of leverage during the 
negotiation process, the entire region had become polarized into two determined and 
fairly unyielding bands.   
 For the smaller nations, like the DR that had benefited substantially by adopting the 
new economic model, it was clear that they had to consistently gauge and adjust to the 
dynamic global situation to maintain any comparative advantage they had accrued.  This 
translated into opening and maintaining new markets, exporting nontraditional goods and 
services, and developing PTAs with nations with similar markets sizes and endowments.  
The fact that the FTAA initiative had broken down did not prevent the smaller nations 
from seeking out new partnerships with each other or with the U.S.  In the Caribbean 
Basin, the latter was especially true, as nations realized the implications involved after 
the CBI and trade liberalization had transformed their nations significantly.   
 The DR was certainly keen to seek new economic opportunities and reached out to 
its Caribbean neighbors in an effort to integrate itself into larger trading entities.  The DR 
specifically viewed its position, both geographically and economically, as a bridge that 
could unite the entire Caribbean basin.  This was established by the FTAs that were 
signed by the DR with the CACM and CARICOM.  These agreements cemented many 
new prospects, but one important piece was missing.  How would the DR maintain the 
preferential treatment status of its goods and services for the long term with the U.S., its 
largest trading partner?  It was the answer to this question that would push not only the 
DR, but also CA, into negotiating a PTA with the U.S.  It is important to look specifically 
at how the DR changed, during the 1970s, from a significantly closed economy 
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dependant on traditional exports, to a nation looking to establish an enduring and 






III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF DOMINICAN ECONOMY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The process of Western Hemisphere regionalization certainly played a major role 
in developing trading blocs like the DR-CAFTA, but to understand the motives behind 
the DR’s willingness to negotiate a PTA, it is just as important to look at the economic 
trajectory the nation took to get to that point.  For any nation to negotiate and attain 
certain terms that will benefit its citizenry in the overall balance of gains and concessions, 
the nation has to have taken steps to put itself in a position where it could leverage its 
strong points.  In the case of the DR, the building of the foundation needed to take 
advantage of any PTA, especially with an economic power like the U.S., can be traced to 
the economic shift that started to transform the nation in the mid-1980s.  As with many 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1980s were years of economic turmoil 
that forced national leaders to implement policies that were austere and pulled back on 
government intervention as a tool to solving problems.120  The DR was not exempt from 
the central economic restructuring trend that smacked the region in the face.  What 
becomes evident in close analysis is that the choices the DR made while opening up its 
market and the economic sectors that were targeted and promoted for growth played a 
key role in how the nation would plug into the global economy during the 1990s and 
2000s.   
The first section of Chapter III will cover the transition that the DR’s economy 
made starting in the mid-1980s, with the economic policies the government took to meet 
the conditions needed for to receive external financial assistance from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  The austere but necessary economic reforms were a result of poor 
decisions made by previous governments.  The latter half of the 1980s was a period when 
politicians made attempts to return the country back to the status quo of the 1970s, but 
the external pressures that forced the country towards reform would not allow the same 
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conditions to flourish.  It was also during this period that the nation started to take 
advantage of the benefits of the CBI, whose provisions came in direct conflict with 
President Joaquin Balaguer’s attempt to reinstall “big government” practices.  
As in many cases, domestic politics played a major part in the economic practices 
that were put in place, and in the 1990s the same politicians who longed for the bygone 
days of statism saw the advantages of adopting the neoliberal policies.121  The 
Dominican government introduced a comprehensive economic plan known as the New 
Economic Program, which implemented significant reforms, but allowed several 
important distortions and policy weaknesses to undermine full progress.  While the DR 
started to experience sustained growth, it also experienced pressure from regional 
competition.  The implications of NAFTA created great concern among the CBI nations.  
They saw some of their benefits erode as the Mexican economy became inextricably 
linked to the rest of North America.  The CBI nations knew they would face a series of 
challenges that included potential trade and investment diversion and the erosion of their 
margin of preference enjoyed under the CBI provisions.  The CBI nations sought to either 
join NAFTA or at the least establish “NAFTA parity”.  In the end due to multiple factors, 
the nations took on the defensive strategy of reforming the CBI and minimizing trade and 
investment diversion.122  
The DR continued on its path of economic liberalization and diversification 
during the latter half of the 1990s, but just as it experienced even greater growth it started 
to feel the weight of increased global pressures.  During this period the DR’s economic 
success was aided by political change and several market friendly economic reforms.  
The pressure for the DR came from the fact that both tourism and the export processing 
zones depended heavily upon the health of the global economy.  During the late 1990s 
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and early 2000s, the country started having problems competing with exports originating 
in Asia and Central America (CA), as the global light manufacturing sector expanded 
significantly.123  This coincided with the DR’s attempts to reach out to its Caribbean 
neighbors in an attempt to form collaborative defense mechanisms against the Asian 
exports.  Many of the Caribbean nations saw the early 2000s as the correct juncture in 
time to seek a bilateral PTA with the U.S., especially since a good portion of their trade 
was directed to and coming from that nation.  For the U.S., the timing was opportune 
because the U.S. understood that it had to maintain its strategic partnerships with the 
Caribbean nations in order to stave of the losses it was suffering from foreign 
competition.124 
Unfortunately, as the DR was reaching out to establish strategic alliances and 
adjusting to the global conditions, it suffered one of the greatest economic collapses of its 
history.  The economic crisis was caused by the government’s decision to bailout the 
country’s third largest bank.  The Banco Intercontinental (Baninter) scandal caused 
significant strain on the country’s public finances, but it also forced the government to set 
stronger regulatory policies that were long overdue.  The quick recovery from the 
economic collapse and the positive steps taken to solve some of the systemic problems 
opened the door for trade negotiations with the U.S.  The DR’s original strategy in 2003 
was to attempt to pursue a bilateral FTA with the U.S.  After careful deliberations the DR 
and the U.S. both agreed that each sides’ interest would be better served if the DR’s 
initiative was docked to the ongoing CAFTA negotiations.  Thus the DR’s economic 
transformation followed a path that pushed it to cement its gained benefits and 
relationships in the light of a dynamic and ever encroaching global environment.  
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B. THE 1980S: FAILED ECONOMIC POLICY AND RESTRUCTURING 
 For the DR, the 1980s were a decade marked by major economic upheavals and 
shifts that forced the leaders of the country to take a very different approach towards 
economic management practices.  Between 1969 and 1973, the DR had one of the highest 
economic growth rates in the world, at an average of 11%, due to high sugar and primary 
commodity prices and a significant boom in increased gold exports.125  As the decade 
winded down, the DR’s terms of trade dropped off sharply as sugar prices fluctuated and 
oil prices increased significantly.  To compound the situation, the government allowed 
growing balance of payment shortfalls, decreasing revenues from extensive tax 
exemptions, and mounting expenditures on state operated companies to increase the 
national debt.126  As with many countries in Latin America, the problems were 
temporarily diverted by the governments’ abilities to refinance their loans, but the 1980s 
would bring a set of conditions that would change the economic landscape.   
The DR ushered in the 1980s with a new political party at the helm that proposed 
certain changes, yet the economic distortions that originated during Joaquin Balaguer’s 
presidency (1966-1978) were becoming evident.  Many of the government’s continued 
malpractices, such as the administration of large public enterprises that included 
industrial, commercial, agricultural, and live stock holdings, the subsidization of import-
substitution industries (ISI), and the use of fixed exchange rates that greatly overvalued 
the Dominican peso (DOP), placed significant burdens on the economy.127  Many of 
these practices were caused by legacy systems left in place dating back to the Rafael L. 
Trujillo Era.  These legacy systems distorted credit markets, limited development, 
generated an inefficient industrial base, and ignored other vital sectors such as education 
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and health.128  Many destructive and often hidden economic maladies had been left to run 
their course without an in depth understanding of the changes needed to adjust to the 
shifting global conditions. 
 The DR’s economic crisis reached a climax when the U.S. decided to reduce 
Dominican sugar exports by 70% between 1981 and 1987.  The crisis was further 
exacerbated by the Latin American banking crisis, caused by Mexico’s moratorium over 
its foreign debt.  The latter shook the confidence levels of foreign lenders, who had been 
happy to lend money to previous Dominican administrations.  As newly elected President 
Jorge Blanco stepped in office, he was forced to negotiate with the IMF as a necessary 
condition to receive renewed loans from foreign banks.129  The situation deteriorated to 
such a point that it was necessary for the government to sign a three-year extended 
facilities agreement whose conditions included lower fiscal deficits, tighter credit 
policies, and other austere economic measures.  The new policy, signed in January of 
1983, allowed the government to renegotiate the terms and maturities of many short and 
medium term loans, but the agreement’s conditions also sparked massive riots caused by 
the devaluation of the DOP and increased food prices.  After extended political 
maneuvering and tensions between the administration and the opposing Congress over 
the IMF conditions, the DR signed a one-year IMF Standby Agreement that included 
more austerity measures and the floating of the DOP.  The latter measures started the DR 
down the path needed to ensure macroeconomic stability, but the reforms and various 
miscalculations by the Blanco Administration took its toll on the ruling party, which 
found itself out of the governance after its four-year stint.130    
 When President Balaguer returned to power in 1986, he completely turned his 
back on all the necessary reforms that Blanco Administration had put in place.  Although 
Balaguer had campaigned on the platform of privatizing and reorganizing the economy, 
what he promised and what he delivered were completely opposite.  By conjuring up the 
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memory of the economic boom of the early 1970s and using the logic of the neo-
Keynesian model and aggregate demand, he expanded the role of the government in the 
economy.  His policies initially electrified the economy and led to a 10% GDP growth in 
1987, which caused the expansion of the internal market, but the policy of expanding the 
money supply almost three fold produced tremendous inflation and devaluation.131  
Ironically, the same distortions and problems that had been in place during his previous 
administration did not provide the lessons needed during the new era.  In 1988, the DR 
economy contracted sharply due to the excessive government spending patterns.  
Balaguer tried to keep the country’s new and rapidly increasing export sector and tourist 
trade as competitive as possible by continuously devaluating the DOP, but this in turn 
substantially eroded the quality of life for many poor Dominicans earning fixed salaries.  
At the end of the decade, the country's foreign debt had reached nearly US$4 billion, 
roughly double the 1980 figure.132  It was evident at the end of the decade that the DR’s 
economy was once again on the ropes desperately fighting in a loosing battle.  
 The Dominican economy during the 1980s could be described as having increased 
debt, persistent levels of deficits in the balance of payments, failed attempts at 
restructuring, and spiraling levels of high inflation.  Although these factors are all 
consistent with what many economists call the lost decade in Latin America, they 
overshadow some of the important positive advances the DR made towards diversifying 
its economy.  The global recession of the early 1980s severely reduced demand for the 
country’s and the basin’s primary exports such as bauxite, sugar, and coffee.  The 
economic contraction forced many of the Caribbean nations to look at different 
alternatives to make their economies grow.133  At the same time that the DR had reached 
the apex of its economic crisis, many of the other nations in the Caribbean Basin were 
also suffering through their own economic debacles; as mentioned in Chapter II, this was 
something the U.S. noticed.  As the DR acquiesced to the IMF’s demands, the CBI was 
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also enacted in an attempt to help revitalize the basin’s economies.  The DR took great 
strides to rapidly diversify away from its primary dependence on sugar and its other 
primary exports and enacted the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) Law 145 of 1983 to fully take 
advantage of the CBI.134  The law offered lucrative incentives for free zone investments 
that included exemptions from import duties, income taxes, and other taxes for up to 
twenty years.  
Many of the new jobs created in the FTZs were in light manufacturing, 
particularly the assembly sector, and the FTZ boom that followed the new law helped to 
offset many of the jobs that were lost, especially in the sugarcane fields.  The first FTZ in 
the DR was opened in 1970, with the objective of generating foreign exchange and jobs, 
but the sector had not progressed as quickly as originally expected.135  The 1980s saw a 
complete turn around in the DR’s light manufacturing operations as jobs soared from 
16,000 in 1980 to nearly 100,000 by 1989, which represented the world's fastest growth 
in FTZ employment during the period.  Of significant note is that 1987 marked a pivotal 
crossover point where the value of assembly exports surpassed that of traditional 
agricultural exports, marking a significant change in the Dominican economic structure 
(table 1).136  Thus the DR had started to become a global platform that was able to 
quickly shift rural workers from agriculture to FTZ employment.  The DR also profited 
tremendously from the increase in tourism during the same period, as it became the 
Caribbean’s fastest growing tourist destination.  The growth of the tourism sector started 
in the 1970s when the Tourist Incentive Law of 1973 designated four specific areas as 
“Polos Turísticos” or touristic poles and provided the needed incentives and mechanisms 
to spur development.137  By 1984, tourism surpassed sugar as the nation’s leading foreign 
                                                 
134 Laura Jaramillo and Cemile Sancak, “Growth in the Dominican Republic and Haiti: Why the Grass 
Been Greener on One Side of Hispaniola” (working paper, Western Hemisphere Department, International 
Monetary Fund, March 2007), 20, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp0763.pdf (accessed 
June 10, 2009).  
135 Gregory, Steven, The Devil Behind the Mirror (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 
137. 
136 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Country Studies: Dominican Republic, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/dotoc.html (accessed June 8, 2009). 
137 Gregory, Steven, The Devil Behind the Mirror (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 
210. 
 48
exchange earner, marking the DR’s efforts to diversify its economy.  Along with the 
latter efforts, the agricultural sector looked towards taking advantage of the CBI by 
placing new emphasis on the export of nontraditional items such as tropical fruits, citrus, 
and ornamental plants to the U.S.138  The exportation of nontraditional exports was the 
bedrock of the CBI, and the DR made the necessary adjustments to exploit the new 
possibilities.  Although the DR faced significant issues caused by debt, restructuring, and 
mismanagement, the country had definitely set down a particular trajectory and laid the 
foundations needed to tie it to the global market that expanded significantly during the 
1990s.  
Table 1.    Dominican Republic: Value of Exports, 1982-87 
(In millions of United States dollars1)  
Kind of Export 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Traditional2 475 452 514 380 360 308 
Free-zone 148 175 194 205 250 323 
Other 294 336 358 365 363 410 
TOTAL 917 963 1,066 950 973 1,041 
1 Free on board. 2 Sugar and derivatives, green coffee, tobacco, and cocoa. 
(From: Library of Congress, 1989)  
C. TRADE LIBERALIZATION, GROWTH & THE PRESSURES OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
 For the DR, the 1990s marked a period of significant economic growth coupled 
with the building of stronger democratic institutions.  Reforms in both the government 
and the economic sector were instrumental in paving the way for increased national 
development.  These two factors fed off of each other to produce an environment that was 
able to take advantage of the available global opportunities.  The rapid expansion of 
tourism and the FTZ sectors started in the previous decade continued on its accelerated 
pace, but it also faced significant challenges.139  The decade can be broken up into two 
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periods based on the pace of changes that occurred, starting with the initial phase of the 
reform effort from 1991 through 1995.  It was during this period that the New Economic 
Program was established by the Balaguer Administration.140  The second phase was the 
new governmental period from 1996 through 1999, which was a direct consequence of 
the “Pact for Democracy”, signed in 1994.  This significant milestone in Dominican 
politics opened the way for free and fair elections by removing Balaguer from the 
presidential contention and bringing to power new leadership that was focused on 
furthering neoliberal reforms.141  
 Unfortunately, the beginning of the decade greeted the DR with avoidable 
political and economic disorder.  During 1990, Balaguer’s Administration continued to 
loosen its financial policies prior to the presidential election, which resulted in inflation 
rising to 100%, a frantic flight of capital and foreign exchange, and the lack of basic 
living amenities.  According to Moya Pons, “never since the end of the Trujillo 
dictatorship, had the DR experienced such a dismal economic and spiritual state.”142  
Ironically, through what many considered fraudulent elections, Balaguer was able to 
maneuver through the deficient electoral process and remain in power.  Although the 
country was paralyzed by shortages of fuel, electricity, running water, and basic 
foodstuffs, the elected government failed to pay its debts to its creditors, and the crisis 
continued to spin out of control.  It as only after the realization of a failed economy and 
intense international pressure from the IMF, World Bank, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) that Balaguer promised to undertake fundamental reforms to 
ease the crisis.143  
 The initial phase of the reform thrust during the first part of the decade was 
codified through the New Economic Program.  The comprehensive program included 
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fiscal consolidation and the liberalization of exchange rates, prices, and interest rates.144  
The nation also made serious attempts to normalize relations with external creditors with 
the help of an IMF Standby Arrangement in 1991, which was extended in 1993.  Fiscal 
consolidation was the main driver of the New Economic Program, and in 1990 the prices 
of many public goods and services were deregulated to reflect opportunity costs, while 
food subsidies were removed.  With the new changes the government was able to shift 
the public sector balance from a deficit of approximately 1% in 1990 to a surplus that 
averaged 2.8% for the next four years.145  Along with these changes there were a series 
of steps taken to revamp several outdated tax laws, strengthen the banking system, 
tighten monetary policy, and enhance the outward orientation of the Dominican 
economy.  The shift in the orientation of the economy was of extreme importance in 
linking the DR with global markets, and was complemented with the Foreign Investment 
Law of 1995, which gave increased guarantees to foreign investors.146  The new law 
paved the way for a new and robust source of capital for the developing nation. 
 The steps taken by the government to implement the reform and stabilization 
program had definitive positive results.  After the disastrous start to the decade, economic 
growth resumed and was led by those sectors that were more open to competition, such as 
light manufacturing, tourism, telecommunications, and construction.  During the 1991-
1995 period, the economy was able to grow at a modest average of over 4%, and inflation 
was drastically reduced to an average just under 8% (figure 1).  With external imbalances 
being generally contained and other macroeconomic indicators indicating a reliable 
environment for investment, the DR started to attract a considerable amount of FDI, 
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which became a steady source of financing for current account deficits.147  At the same 
time that it was beginning to take significant steps to link up to the global market, the DR 
and the entire region started to feel the pressures of open competition.  The first wind of 
concern came when the EAI was proposed by the Bush Administration.  Although the 
EAI was greeted by many as a plan to open up trade throughout the entire hemisphere, 
some leaders of the Caribbean nations were concerned about the potential erosion of 
preferential treatment that was attained through the CBI.  Many believed that their 
nations were already at a disadvantage in trade with the U.S. despite the great amount of 
duty free access many of their products received.148  Although the initial concerns were 
based upon the potential of the establishment of the EAI, the erosion of terms became a 
reality when the NAFTA negotiations started to take shape.  
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Figure 1.   Real GDP Growth & Inflation Rates (1981-1998) (From: Young, 1999) 
 The NAFTA presented all the CBI nations with three major challenges, which 
were possible trade diversion, investment diversion, and the demotion of status in the 
U.S.’s pyramid of hierarchy for export products entering the nation.  The inclusion of 
Mexico in the NAFTA effectively eroded and undermined the margin of preference 
enjoyed by the DR and CA under CBI.  Under the NAFTA many firms, especially U.S. 
companies, had the ability to move their enterprises to Mexico and take advantage of 
duty free status and the larger and inexpensive labor pool.149  In the first two years 
following the establishment of the NAFTA, DR apparel export growth fell to only 12% in 
contrast to the 29% that was reported from 1992 through 1994.  Conversely Mexican 
apparel exports grew 123% during the same period, up from the 70% growth they 
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experienced before the NAFTA went into effect.150  The FTAA initiative, which was 
more concrete than the EAI, further complicated potential trade relationships as CBI 
nations started to evaluate the possibilities of establishing bilateral FTAs with the 
NAFTA as an entity and with each member nation individually.151   
Initially many of the small Caribbean nations hoped there would be a possibility 
of attaining membership in the NAFTA, but two major factors took that likelihood away.  
The first was the fallout of the Mexican peso (MXP) devaluation in 1994 that sparked 
popular outcry in the U.S. against the entire NAFTA design.  The second was that the 
small nations were in no way close to meeting the rigorous conditions imposed by the 
NAFTA concept.  Even nations like Chile, a model of neoliberal success in Latin 
America, didn’t meet the rigorous requirements, thus the smaller economies had to find 
new ways to cope with the changing trade environment.152  In essence, nations like the 
DR had to make quick adjustments in order to keep their economies growing.  The DR 
and Jamaica, which had done the most to take advantage of the CBI opportunities, led a 
new strategy and tried to press the U.S. to provide “NAFTA parity” to minimize the 
negative effects that were being experienced.153  These attempts were met with resistance 
from U.S. textile and other producers at the time, but global conditions later in the decade 
caused direct pressure on the U.S. apparel and textile industries and forced them to 
reconsider their partnerships.  
 The DR was able to increase its growth rate to 6%-8% during the second half of 
the decade.  This growth was the result of a new government that was committed to 
advancing reforms that had been built on a solid economic foundation.154  The growth 
helped place the DR among the fastest growing economies in the world during that 
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period.  Although President Leonel Fernández Administration’s new agenda faced 
significant opposition in the Congress, their solution to combating poverty was based on 
the prerequisite of continued economic growth.  There was one thing that was certain, 
and it was that the opposition could not deny some of the positive results of market 
liberalization.  The keystone of the Fernández Administration was based on trade 
liberalization, privatization, and public sector modernization, which included increasing 
the quality of social services.  Economic expansion was facilitated by several key 
economic reforms and the increased influx of FDI (figure 2).  One of the major reforms 
taken was the Public Enterprise Reform Law of 1997 that allowed increased private 
sector representation in certain productive sectors such as electricity and sugar.  It was 
the government’s insistence on maintaining fiscal and monetary discipline that helped to 
underpin the success, and in looking at past Dominican history, this was a major step 
towards maintaining sustained progress. 155   
 
 
Figure 2.   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Inflows 
(From: Inter-American Development Bank, 2007) 
It is not a coincidence that during this period the DR tried to reach out to its 
Caribbean neighbors in CACM and CARICOM in order to cement new alliances and 
open new markets and opportunities.  Although the DR was looking for new 
opportunities through the process of subregionalization, what became apparent during 
this time was that global competition started to take an increased toll on the nation’s 
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thriving sectors.  Tourism and the export processing zones were the key elements in 
transforming the economy, but at the same time both of these sectors were extremely 
connected to the state of the global economy.  The threat of marginalization under the 
neoliberal construct was a reality that was always on the horizon, and it needed to be 
dealt with continuously on a real time basis.  As the end of the century approached, many 
Dominican FTZs were facing fierce competition from cheaper goods originating in 
China, Asia, and CA, and this caused national leaders to look for new ways to adjust to 
the dynamic conditions.156  In the latter half of the 1990s as other nations in the 
Caribbean region were experiencing similar circumstances, they collectively tried to 
negotiate with the U.S. through of the CBI structure.  The CBI nations started to press the 
U.S. for an increase in the range of products that were available for duty free status 
during the 1997 Caribbean Summit Meeting held in Bridgetown, Barbados.157    
The realization of what the U.S. considered “Caribbean trade enhancement” 
occurred for the CBI nations in 2000 with the passing of the Caribbean Basin Trade and 
Partnership Act (CBTPA).  It was expected that by moving certain portions of the 
manufacturing production chain to CBI nations, U.S. companies would be able to take 
advantage of lower manufacturing costs, reduced shipping times, better customer service, 
reduced overhead costs, and fewer markdowns.  The CBTPA was specifically structured 
to provide the opportunities needed to establish new supply chain partnerships to redirect 
light manufacturing from the Far East to the Western Hemisphere.  This strategy created 
a mutually beneficial relationship for all partners since the CBI nations would be using 
mostly U.S. textiles as inputs. 158  It was under this new partnership that the strategic 
question of how the textile and apparel industries of the U.S. and the Caribbean nations 
would handle the emerging economic pressure from China and Asia would be framed.   
While the U.S. extended more privileges to the CBI nations, the enhancement was 
also a direct response to support the U.S.’s competition with similar production sharing 
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ventures in Asia that were seriously challenging U.S. production and employment in the 
textile and apparel industries.  In the period from 1997 to 2002 the eventual DR-CAFTA 
nations experienced a decline in the U.S. apparel market share from 11. 7% to 9.4 %.  At 
the same time China’s shares increased from 9.1% to 13.0 %.159  It was estimated by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (USTIC) that foreign competition had caused the 
U.S. to lose 542,000 jobs from 1998-2002, which represented a loss of 38% in the textile 
and apparel industries.  Pressure increased on these industries in the early half of the 
current decade as the U.S., Canada, and the EU were transitioning towards the 
elimination of quotas for all World Trade Organization (WTO) nations.  This transition 
was required under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, and its final 
implementation came into effect on January 1, 2005.  The deadline resulted in the 
liberalization of the framework for world trade in textiles and apparel.  At the same time 
the large amount of suppliers in the market, rising import penetration, and the changing 
of consumer tastes contributed to the downward pressure on prices of apparel and 
textiles.160  As the U.S. textile and apparel industries faced shrinking domestic markets, 
the thought of sourcing highly labor intensive apparel production to low cost foreign 
producers in the Caribbean became part of an extensive consolidation and restructuring 
process.161  The expiration of quotas would have an immediate impact on the DR’s 
garment industry as it lost approximately 40,000 jobs in that sector in the first two years 
after its implementation.162  The new strategy created a potential win-win situation at the 
time, since 56% of apparel and textile imports from the Caribbean were assembled from 
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U.S. material as opposed to the 1% from China.  The strategic partnership was also 
expected to decrease the rate of job losses in both in the U.S. and the DR.163  
In the backdrop of all the trade and liberalization changes that were occurring at 
the turn of the century, it is important to emphasize that although the FTAA initiative 
started to stall, the U.S. maintained its position of entering into bilateral PTA negotiations 
with willing nations.  On the sidelines of the IX meeting of the FTAA Trade Negotiation 
Commission in September 2001, the five members of the CACM met with the U.S. to 
talk about the deepening bilateral trade and investment relations.  The DR would also 
make its case for establishing a permanent PTA with the U.S. in the summer of 2003.164  
From the perspective of these nations, the goal was to reduce any remaining barriers to 
the U.S. market not covered by the CBI and to increase flows of FDI.  Although the 
CBTPA had increased trade opportunities, under the stressed economic climate that 
existed the nations wanted to make the benefits enjoyed under the CBI permanent and 
further develop the apparel assembly or maquiladora industry.165  Unfortunately just as 
the DR started to negotiate the FTA conditions with the U.S., it faced a major banking 
crisis that caused ripple effects throughout its entire economy.  The effects of the scandal 
forced the DR to undertake major reforms in order to take advantage of any opportunity 
that came out of a potential U.S.-DR FTA.  
D. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 2003-2004 & IMPLICATIONS FOR DR-
CAFTA 
By the beginning of the 21st century, the DR had been effectively transformed into 
a service oriented economy that relied on tourism, business, and the apparel industry.  
However, the growth experienced during the 1990s didn’t prevent a different political 
party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), from taking the reigns in 2000.  In part, 
the change in government was due to the provision in the DR Constitution that prevented 
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the incumbent president from running for a consecutive term.  Under President Hipólito 
Mejía, the government faced significant challenges providing social services for the poor, 
increasing education, and aiding the small and middle sized business and agricultural 
sectors that were hurt by the privatization of government owned enterprises and trade 
liberalization.166  It was certain that although the nation had experienced impressive 
economic growth, there were still many reforms, such as further financial sector 
deepening, the regulation of banking practices, and the enhancement of competition in 
markets and services that needed to be institutionalized to maintain growth.167  The Mejía 
Administration needed to address some of the latter issues directly when it came into 
office, but the PRD led government, which had traditionally run on a center-left social 
democratic platform, would face a its largest challenge when it had to deal with collapse 
and scandal involving the Banco Intercontinental (Baninter). 
The economic crisis that brought the DR’s economy to its knees was directly 
related to the lack of institutionalized reform desperately needed in the financial sector.  
In 2003, Baninter was the DR’s third largest bank, but a lack of regulatory policy and 
corrupt bookkeeping practices were uncovered that year.  This revealed that the bank had 
extended unregulated $50,000 lines of credit to numerous government officials.168  Many 
of the officials abused the lines of credit and didn’t repay their loans, which ironically 
caused the government to step in and launch a widespread investigation.  The 
investigation, which discovered further embezzlement and fraud, consequently caused 
Baninter’s customers to lose complete confidence in the bank and to demand their 
deposits.  The rush to retrieve deposits caused the bank to collapse.  Subsequently, two 
other banks decided to close their businesses after the Central Bank mandated all banks in 
the nation maintain a 10%-15% higher reserve on any money that was not earning 
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interest.169  The closing of the three banks triggered mass panic and a second larger 
money rush throughout the country, as many people feared their banking institutions 
would be the next to close.  The government was put in a very difficult position as to how 
they would try to contain the situation, and it was basically left with two choices.  Either 
let the system run its course and potentially allow the crisis to destroy all the economic 
progress that had been made, or step in and formulate a bailout package, which would 
plunge the small nation into considerable debt.   
The Dominican government weighed its options and chose to launch the largest 
depositor bailout in the nation’s history.  It was not limited to cover Baninter.  It also 
included the closed Banco Mercantil and Bancocredito.170  The decision took a 
controversial turn when the government decided to issue Central Bank certificates of 
deposits that would cover 100% of all the depositor’s losses. 171  This proved to be a 
costly decision for the entire nation, which had to absorb a much higher price than just 
the guarantee of the lost deposits.  The immediate ramifications of the bailout cost the 
nation US $2.2 billion or 20% of the nation’s GDP, more than 100% devaluation of the 
DOP, an increased external debt of US$7.7 billion, an unemployment rate of 16.5 %, and 
a rate of inflation that skyrocketed to over 40%.172   
Furthermore, the nation’s economy continued on a downward tailspin because the 
Mejía Administration failed to comply with conditions that would release funds from the 
IMF’s Standby Agreement.173  The mishandling of the situation caused significant 
investment and capital flight at the same time that the nation was already suffering from 
the external pressures on its export industries.174  This was an especially disconcerting 
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situation for a nation that was trying to attract new sources of FDI to fuel its growth.  The 
overall situation also didn’t favor the country that was looking to establish a PTA with 
the U.S. and the CA nations, yet amazingly enough the DR displayed amazing resiliency 
and come back from what the IMF considered one of the major banking crises that was 
registered from 1970-2007.175  
To recuperate from the debacle, the new government, once again under Leonel 
Fernández, negotiated with the IMF early in 2005 and earnestly accepted the conditions 
imposed by IMF’s Standby Agreement.  The US$665 million agreement was paid to the 
Central Bank and was directed towards strengthening the bank’s reserves position and 
balance of payments.  The program also opened up opportunities for new resources that 
totaled an approximate US$2.7 billion.176  Although it was important for the nation to 
receive the necessary funds needed to stabilize the bleak situation, what was even more 
important for the long term were the steps taken to reform the entire banking institution.  
The IMF’s stipulations required extensive changes in the banking sector’s laws and 
procedures that included supervision and general audits by foreign banking specialists.  
The IMF also required that laws be passed, which set defined procedures for cases that 
presented systematic risk to the entire banking structure.177   
Since 2005, President Fernández and the new Central Bank governor have 
implemented a new regulatory framework and restructured the banking supervisory body, 
which has led to increased accountability costs for all the banks.  The steps to 
institutionalize modern and transparent banking transactions and the successful 
completion of the IMF agreement have restored public and international confidence in the 
financial sector in a fairly short time.178  The reforms turned the economic situation 
around rather quickly despite higher oil prices and were reflected in remarkable GDP 
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growth of 9.3% in 2005, 10.7% in 2006, and 8.5% in 2007 (figure 3).179  As Juan 
Arteaga, executive vice-president of DR bank Grupo Progresso, stated, “fiscal 
reforms…are important for the DR-CAFTA agreement.  These reforms are necessary if 
we are going to be competitive with other nations.  The new regulations through the 
superintendant of banks are very strict.  But the banking industry is currently very 
stable.”180  The importance of the reforms and the quick recovery cannot be understated, 
as the DR moved towards its negotiations with the U.S. and CA nations.  It was important 
for the nation to present a solid economic foundation before it opened its markets to the 
new FTA conditions, which presented the nation not only with new opportunities but also 
with considerable challenges to overcome.  It was also important for the DR to commit 
itself to higher levels of transparency and anti-corruption measures that would be a 
keystone of the DR-CAFTA and would be codified in Chapter XVIII of the final text.181 
 
 
Figure 3.   GDP Growth (From: Inter-American Development Bank, 2007) 
F. CONCLUSION 
 For the DR, the road towards economic transformation was like a combustion 
engine that had several cycles of starts and stops along the way.  During the 1980s, the 
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fuels that had propelled the economy, i.e., primary exports such as sugar, gold, etc., were 
no longer globally demanded in the same quantities as they had been in the past.  As has 
been the case for many developing nations, the overreliance on a small group of primary 
export products as the foundation of an economy can lead to periods of great successes 
and disasters.  They key for the DR would have been to fully diversify the economy, 
during the 1970s, with the gains it had made from the high commodity prices.  The early 
economic boom that lasted for four years saw the birth of the FTZs and tourism sectors, 
but at the time they were not major contributors to the overall economy.  One of the 
major problems was that the “big government” practices infiltrated many aspects of the 
entire economy and latently undermined any success.  The inefficiencies and legacy 
systems that were guided by the Balaguer Administration were hidden restraints that did 
not allow the structure to fully develop and advance.  In the end the lack of external 
demand for primary exports, the great distortions within the ISI driven system, deficits in 
the balance of payments coupled with increased debt, and a lack of a flexible and realistic 
economic strategy brought the entire Dominican economy to a halt.  
 The DR was not left with many choices and was forced to undertake major reforms 
in order to revive the economy.  Reforms, coupled with the CBI, provided the framework 
needed for the nation to shift its economy towards a more open and export oriented 
market.  What became evident was that the DR was amenable to making changes to take 
full advantage of the opportunities the CBI presented.  The country started to focus its 
energies towards the thriving export processing and tourism sectors, while it also sought 
opportunities in other nontraditional products.  The economy was hindered by the poor 
policies taken by new Balaguer Administration, but the country was too far into its 
transformation to turn back to its previous state.  The integration of the DR’s economy to 
the region in the early 1990s was a step for the nation to become linked to the global 
economy, but the union had its price.  The DR became exposed to the open market forces 
that drive supply and demand, and it was necessary for the nation react to the new 
changes that came with trade liberalization, and that included increased competition.   
 Increased reforms paved the way for further trade liberalization, privatization, and 
public sector modernization, which included increasing the quality of the DR’s social 
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services.  The reforms were needed in order for the DR to maintain economic growth, 
and deal with the intense competition that was coming by the way of China and other 
Asian nations.  Regional partnerships through alliances and PTAs with other nations in 
the Caribbean Basin and as components of the greater FTAA initiative became a way to 
combat the surging tide of Asian products.  The U.S.’s involvement with the DR and the 
Caribbean, through the CBI, also became an increasingly important piece of the chess 
game in trying to avoid increased losses in the textile and apparel industries.  The U.S. 
was willing to fortify the CBI to create and cement strategic partnerships that would 
prove beneficial to all parties involved.  The DR was certainly in need of additional help 
to defend itself against the losses it had started to experience in the FTZ sector.  The 
defensive strategy started by the CBI, although amplified, led the DR to seek a permanent 
solution to what appeared to be an ever increasing and changing problem.  After firmly 
establishing itself as a service and export oriented economy, the DR needed to maintain 
an open outlet for its products and services.  The establishment of a permanent PTA with 
the U.S. and CA would help it achieve this goal, but it would have to face a major 
economic crisis before it could take the country to the next level.  
 The economic crisis was devastating to the nation, but perhaps it brought out some 
of the weaknesses that the DR still needed to work on.  It also proved once again, just as 
it did in the previous two decades, that true and genuine reforms go a long way in 
stabilizing a country and putting the economy back on the track of growth.  The banking 
sector is one of the key elements within an economy that needs to have credibility and 
efficiency.  It was crucial for the nation to weed out the bad practices that had been 
allowed to fester over time.  The government also learned a harsh lesson about how its 
reactions to such a catastrophic event could have severe ramifications.  Had the correct 
supervisory and regulatory mechanism been in place, the crisis could potentially have 
been contained to much lower levels.  The nation was able to recuperate from the major 
setback and was able to prepare itself for the negotiation process it had originally sought 
with the U.S. and CA.  The comeback was crucial for the DR.  It needed to act in an 
expeditious manner before it not only lost jobs to China and Asia, but also before it was 
blocked out from attaining the future opportunities that were being presented to the 
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members of the CACM.  The DR faced certain challenges during and after the DR-
CAFTA negotiation process, and it is important to understand how they affected the 
country.  The nation had to make concessions to gain access to the newly created free 
trade area, while continuing to take on further reforms.  It was also was expected that the 
DR would have the opportunities to achieve increased benefits in the long run.  The latter 
will be the focus of the final chapter.  
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IV.  DR-CAFTA & UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES INVOLVED 
IN THE DR’S DECISION TO JOIN THE CAFTA NEGOTIATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The road towards economic transformation brought the DR towards a fork in the 
road at the turn of the 21st century.  The country had taken the necessary steps towards 
getting away from its dependence on primary export products, but it had moved into a 
competitive environment that was quick to reward those nations that implemented change 
but also punished those that failed to adapt.  The DR had achieved its goal of plugging its 
economy into the regional and global economic structure, but it needed to make choices 
that would help it maintain its growth.  The DR had to make a choice among three major 
alternatives that would drive its future economic development; (1.) to maintain its current 
position and try find ways to overcome its declining position on its own; (2.). to seek a 
bilateral trade agreement with its major trading partner, the U.S.; (3) or to join the 
similarly endowed CACM nations in attempting to leverage a better position in 
establishing a regional trade agreement with U.S.  It became clear to the DR that the 
losses that were being incurred by the cheaper goods coming from Asia and CA and the 
shifting of production to countries with lower wages were starting to mount.182  
Combined with the global textile and apparel quotas elimination that was quickly 
approaching in 2005, the leaders of the DR came to the realization that its economy was 
not as robust or dynamic enough to overcome the difficulties on its own.    
 For the Western Hemisphere nations, regionalization, fostered by the FTAA 
initiative, became the centerpiece of the strategy to deal some of the global economic 
pressures during the late 1990s.  The DR made solid attempts to build strategic and 
economic partnerships within the Caribbean Basin through the CACM and CARICOM, 
and was able to attain further outlets for its products and services through the CBI, 
CBTPA, and CARIFORUM.  Thus the trend of building subregional blocs that would 
feed into the potential FTAA and lock in the privileges of trade with the U.S. had 
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tremendous influence on the DR.  The DR also wanted the privileges attained under the 
CBI and CBTPA to become a permanent part of the nation’s economic structure and 
developmental strategy.  For the DR, the CBI, which had been enhanced in 2000 but 
which required periodic reauthorization by Congress, was a cause of major concern.  In 
light of the changing economic conditions and pressures, it was important for the DR to 
lock in their accessibility to larger markets and continue to increase its opportunities to 
attract U.S. FDI.  The latter investments were crucial in the strategic apparel and textile 
partnership that was a key component of the nation’s export driven development 
strategy.183  
 In deciding amongst the three previous alternatives, the DR initially engaged the 
U.S. as an individual country seeking to establish a bilateral FTA.  The U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) welcomed the possibility of establishing a comprehensive, 
mutually advantageous trade agreement with the largest CBI beneficiary. This was 
determined to be a progression under the CBTPA’s structure.  At the same time the 
USTR wanted to address the same disciplines or subjects as those included in the FTA 
that had been initiated with the members of CACM, while negotiating specific market 
access issues with the DR.  The USTR also thought that in an effort to strengthen the 
economic ties between the DR, CA, and the U.S. and in order to present one FTA 
package to the U.S. Congress, it would be seek to integrate the DR in the CAFTA 
negotiations.184  Although the U.S. initially negotiated a bilateral FTA with the DR, once 
the agreement was concluded it was easily docked it into the larger CAFTA.  This 
arrangement was also beneficial for the DR, since it had already established a FTA with 
the CACM nations.  The DR would not have to renegotiate terms and conditions with 
each individual CA nation, as would have been the case if the entities were covered under 
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separate FTAs.  The inclusion of the DR into the CAFTA also helped open further 
opportunities to the DR to trade with the CA and further eliminate any tariffs and 
nontariff barriers that existed under the CA-DR FTA.   
 This chapter will provide a general overview of the DR-CAFTA, and look at the 
overarching goals that the FTA intends to achieve.  The FTA provides increased 
opportunities for all sides, but the Caribbean nations face particular circumstances that 
will transform their economies tremendously once all the provisions are enacted.  The 
DR-CAFTA was not just limited to trade, but also included essential provisions to 
address labor, corruption, transparency, the environment, and intellectual property rights 
(IPR).  These factors were considered essential to maximizing the benefits that could 
arise from open trade and to aid development in certain areas.  The next section will look 
at some of the issues the DR had to resolve during the negotiations process and during the 
implementation phase.  This proved to be important as the DR delayed the enforcement 
of the FTA several times.  The analysis will continue with a look at the DR’s expected 
gains, losses, and challenges through this entire process.  It is obvious that the DR entered 
the FTA believing that overall it would benefit from the arrangement, but it had to be 
willing to concede to several items.  It will be important to look at how the nation plans 
to adapt and shift some of it important economic sectors.  The DR will also have to 
constantly look at its upcoming challenges, which could include a second shift away or 
transformation from the maquiladora industry that is in continuous decline.  Economic 
diversification is the key towards getting away from the dependence of any specific 
product or sector, and the DR has looked at further opportunities in the smaller business 
sector and nontraditional exports to continue to drive its economy.  Just as the DR shifted 
away from its dependence on primary exports in the 1980s, it will be just as important for 
its leaders to note when it is time to introduce change or amend its export oriented 
economy.  
B. THE DR-CAFTA  
The DR-CAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement whose stated aim is to 
liberalize the U.S., Dominican, and Central American markets, while creating a free trade 
zone similar to what was created in the NAFTA.  It was specifically designed to 
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“eliminate tariffs and trade barriers and expand regional opportunities for the workers, 
manufacturers, consumers, farmers, ranchers and service providers of all the 
countries.”185  The DR-CAFTA immediately eliminated tariffs on more than 80% of U.S. 
exports of consumer and industrial products, with the remaining tariffs being phased out 
in the ten year period following each individual country’s enforcement date.186  On the 
other side, the Caribbean nations were given 100% elimination on all non-textile and 
non-agricultural goods.187  The negotiated agreement dealt with many sensitive subjects 
or disciplines, which affected all the parties involved.  For the U.S., the overall balance of 
trade was not expected to affect its economy significantly, but the DR and CA were 
opening their nations up to changes that were expected to transform many sectors of their 
developing economies. 
The market access issues involving agriculture and the textile & apparel industry 
were the most difficult to resolve, since the DR-CAFTA’s provisions were aimed at 
reducing and eliminating trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas.  It was decided that 
DR-CAFTA would remove all duties on textile and apparel items that fit under the 
agreement’s rule of origin sections.188  The latter provisions of the FTA were of 
significant importance since apparel and textiles were the biggest imports coming out of 
the DR and CA.  In many cases Central American and Dominican apparel was already 
duty free under the CBTPA provided the yarn, and not necessarily the fiber (yarn forward 
rule), had originated in the U.S.  The DR-CAFTA incorporated provisions that allowed 
the limited use of yarns in the assembly process from NAFTA and third party nations in 
order to compete with apparel originating in Asia.  Although these rules were adopted, 
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some textile producers complained that the rules were still too restrictive and did not 
open up the markets enough to allow for effective competition with other markets.189 
1. Agriculture  
The DR-CAFTA’s provisions concerning agriculture will have a major impact on 
the DR and CA nations.  The Latin American nations felt extremely vulnerable during the 
negotiations due to the threat that the importation of key staples from the U.S. such as 
corn, rice, and beans poised.  The leaders thought that an uncontrolled influx of basic 
foodstuffs could quickly overwhelm the DR and CA markets and cause massive 
displacement issues.190  Yet one of the underlying pillars of the FTA was to shift the DR 
and CA nations away not only from traditional export products but also from certain less 
profitable domestically consumed agricultural products.  It is envisioned that the DR and 
CA will eventually replace traditional subsistence farming with value added agribusiness 
operations, which will allow many affected agricultural jobs to shift towards 
manufacturing and services.  It is expected that when the FTA is completely enacted all 
agricultural trade will be tariff free except for imported sugar by the U.S., potatoes and 
union growing in Costa Rica, and white corn in all of the Central American nations.191 
This is clearly a major change for the region, since agriculture continues to be a 
significant source of income and employment for many of the people in the area.  
The DR-CAFTA didn’t include provisions for domestic support programs, but it 
did provide generous transition schedules to all the countries for sensitive agricultural 
products and the option to use special safeguard measures.  Agricultural products have 
the most liberal tariff phase out schedules, with up to 20 years for certain items.  This 
approach to the transformation was a way to prepare the countries that were heavily 
dependant on small and medium farming to generate plans to accommodate the structural 
adjustment.  Although the transition period is fairly long there are still major concerns 
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due to the ill effects U.S. subsidized products could have on the entire region.192  For the 
DR and CA it was important to learn the important lessons from the NAFTA and how the 
similar arrangement of market liberalization affected Mexico.  Just as in the DR-CAFTA 
nations, the vast majority of Mexican farmers cultivated medium and small sized farms 
that usually dealt with fewer technological inputs and were not able to compete with the 
large scale and highly subsidized agribusiness giants of the U.S. and Canada.  Many 
Mexican farmers were forced to grow nontraditional crops and even diversified their 
incomes through the use of grazing.  Others attempted to increase their yields by 
increasing the use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers, which has caused significant 
damage to the environment.193  These are scenarios that are likely to repeat themselves in 
the DR-CAFTA context if the leaders of the nations don’t play an active role in 
addressing these problems from their inception.  
2. Labor 
Other major areas associated with the new liberalization process were labor and 
the environment.  In many ways the fact that these issues were being brought up indicates 
that the DR-CAFTA was going beyond trading factors and was trying to engage the 
social policies that needed to be enacted to promote effective liberalization policies.  It 
was agreed that is was important to make provisions in the agreement that would address 
these concerns, but initially there was disagreement as to how aggressive the content of 
the charter should be.194  It can be argued that trade liberalization, left to run its own 
course, will lead to increases in standards of living for all.  But as is frequently seen in 
Latin America, increases in inequality are often seen side by side with overall economic 
growth.  In order to address the labor and environmental issues all the parties agreed to 
abide by the rules of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and uphold their 
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commitments to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
its Follow Up.  Nevertheless, the opponents of the agreement in the U.S. questioned 
whether the DR and CA could effectively live up to the standards.195  
Two main themes came to the forefront during the negotiations related to labor 
standards in the DR and CA nations, which were considered weak.  The first issue was to 
what extent the DR and CA had adequate labor laws, and the second was whether the 
DR-CAFTA could meet the standards set by the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).  U.S. 
labor advocates thought that some DR-CAFTA nations lacked the proper protection for 
worker’s rights in their labor codes, and even if the laws existed many of the enforcement 
mechanisms are nonexistent.196  In order to demonstrate that the DR and CA were in 
compliance to the ILO’s mandates the nations requested that the ILO conduct a study of 
the labor laws, and it was concluded that the principles were guaranteed either through 
the constitutions or enacted laws.  The DR-CAFTA nations have admitted in their 
individual reports that they lacked the financial resources and expertise to enforce good 
labor practices, and that perhaps the DR-CAFTA could be used to achieve higher 
standards through the Labor Cooperation Building Mechanism that is included in the 
Labor section (16.5) of the agreement.197 
In part there needs to be a clear understanding of the nature of labor within the 
DR-CAFTA nations.  In general the DR-CAFTA nations didn’t develop strong labor 
parties or unions in the past.  In many cases, unions and labor associations provide the 
lines of communication between workers and management and define worker rules, but 
in the DR and CA many of these same groups are seen as corrupt and inefficient.  In the 
DR, Ignacio Hernández, the General Secretary of the Dominican Federation of Free 
Trade Zone Workers (FEDOTRAZONAS) stated in 2005, “Here the term ‘freedom of 
association’ is devoid of meaning.  It merely exists on paper in the law and in the 
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Republic's Constitution, but not in practice.  Any worker who makes a fuss and starts 
making demands is immediately sacked under some pretext.”198  FTZs are areas that are 
particularly prone to labor abuses as firms refuse to recognize unions, distribute blacklists 
of union activists, and force workers to work extended hours with out extra pay.  In the 
DR and CA many people that would otherwise lack jobs are compelled to accept 
substandard conditions in order to earn enough to feed their families. 199  
3. Democratic Institutions & Poverty Reduction 
Many proponents of the DR-CAFTA looked at broader geopolitical and strategic 
concerns such as fighting terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, but to many an 
important expectation of the DR-CAFTA was to try to reinforce stability by providing the 
institutional structures that will help build democracy and reduce poverty.  DR-CAFTA is 
expected to provide the mechanisms needed to increase political and economic stability 
by supporting the rule of law.  As governments, markets, and civil society combine their 
efforts through democratically supported practices the region will hopefully become more 
stable, predictable, and economically integrated, while providing greater economic 
prospects at home.200  In an effort to provide one of the foundations of democracy, 
Chapter 18 of the FTA spells out specific rules concerning transparency objectives for 
transactions conducted between all the nations involved.  The section specifically 
requires all nations to publish or make available any laws, regulations, procedures, and 
administrative rulings of general application respecting any manner covered by this 
agreement.  It forces all parties to establish or maintain judicial or administrative 
tribunals or procedures for the purpose of prompt review, and where warranted correction 
of final administrative actions regarding the agreement.  There are also provisions to try 
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to eliminate bribery and corruption in international trade and investment.201  For 
democracy to flourish these are important elements, but one major flaw of the agreement 
is that it does not specifically spell out provisions as to how the DR-CAFTA will actually 
help to solidify democracy.  In many cases the reinforcement of democratic institutions is 
expected to be a natural offspring of the covenant without setting out clear procedures 
and time-dated goals for the progress to occur.  
To make significant inroads against poverty and aiding the rural sector, the U.S. 
government has provided more than $650 million dollars in trade related assistance to the 
DR-CAFTA nations since 2003.  It is an effort to help support rural development and 
reduce poverty.  Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua have received money to help improve rural roads and highways, 
education, and enterprise development.  The DR and Guatemala have not qualified for 
the MCC, but through USAID they have received increases of $10 million dollars since 
FY 2007 that are aimed at promoting rural electrification and development of small rural 
business and agribusiness.  Other examples of support for the poor sectors in the DR-
CAFTA nations include U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) assistance to small 
farmers to develop local, regional, and international markets for their products and the 
support in the construction of irrigation and other infrastructure to allow farmers to 
compete in global markets.202  These aid packages are closely linked to the DR-CAFTA, 
but they are not direct improvements caused by the benefits of being involved in the 
FTA.  It will be important to closely monitor the changes in agriculture, especially when 
the major shifts, due to agribusiness, start to take their tolls.  The aid programs help the 
poor and the rural sectors, but it will be important to transition many of the citizens 
involved in agriculture towards other employable and productive sectors of the economy. 
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C. ISSUES DURING THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
PHASES 
 The negotiations to form the U.S.-DR FTA were initiated under the careful 
guidance of the USTR, Robert B. Zoellick, in January of 2004.  Although the U.S.-DR 
FTA was negotiated separately and subsequently drafted in the spring of 2004, the FTA 
was negotiated with the expectation of integrating it with the CAFTA.203  All the parties 
were able to come to a consensus to include the DR by August of 2004, but even after the 
FTA was signed by all the associated nations there were several contentious points that 
almost prevented the DR from being integrated to the new scheme.  The greatest threat to 
the DR’s inclusion came to light when the DR included a provision in the Fiscal Reform 
Law of 2004 that would add a 25% tariff on all imported U.S. beverages containing corn 
syrup as a sweetener.204  This was a controversial move, which gained support in the DR 
Congress after many sugar producers demanded increased protection from foreign 
imports.  The producers claimed that the introduction of imported corn syrup sweetened 
beverages would cause an approximate loss of 17% of the local market.205  The key issue 
with this law, which was surprisingly supported by the reformist President Fernández, 
was that it went against the main principles associated with a FTA.  It was expected that 
DR would allow open markets and free competition to replace protectionist practices in 
the newly created space, yet this was a good example of the problems the nation would 
have to face under the new framework.  The sugar industry exerted pressure on the DR 
Congress, but in the new era the ramifications of such actions were much higher than 
expected.   
 The expected backlash from the U.S. came almost immediately, and in an official 
statement Zoellick clearly stated, “Inform President Leonel Fernández that I cannot 
recommend the DR for inclusion in the free trade agreement package if the tariff on corn 
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sweetened beverages is applied.”206  At the time the USTR was dealing with the U.S. 
Congress, and he was not willing to hold back the process for one nation.  Some U.S. 
congressmen advocated the DR’s inclusion, but at the same time questioned the country's 
commitment to free trade due to the tariff measure.207  It was clear that a demarcation 
line had been drawn, which caused the DR government to reconsider its options.  It 
became obvious that the price of maintaining the tariff and being excluded from the DR-
CAFTA would have been disastrous to a nation that was trying to recover from a major 
economic crisis.  At the same time other issues also loomed on the horizon such as the 
world textile and apparel quotas elimination, which were already expected to affect the 
country.  In the end the DR acceded to the USTR’s position and removed the 
protectionist measure, but the lesson learned was that it would be impossible in the future 
to try to protect certain sectors that were not competitive and could not adjust to new 
circumstances.   
 The DR-CAFTA was scheduled to come into force once the U.S. and any other 
signatory had officially declared that they had completed all the required legal procedures 
according to the charter.  The original dateline was set for January 1, 2005, but the 
proceedings through the U.S. Congress took longer than expected.  All the member 
nations, except for the DR and Costa Rica, were able to get their legislative bodies to pass 
the agreement by the time President George W. Bush issued Proclamation 7987 
implementing the FTA on February 26, 2006.208  It is interesting to note that it was the 
two largest Caribbean economies that had the most difficulties in meeting all the 
requirements to enforce the FTA in their respective countries.  Although the passage of 
the FTA was not as controversial in the DR as it was in Costa Rica, there was a 
significant lag between the time the DR’s Chamber of Deputies sent the approved 
agreement to the president and when he finally signed it.  The period lasted from 
September 6, 2005 until March 1, 2007, and the impasse caused significant worries 
                                                 
206 Polanco, “EEUU rechaza impuesto.”  
207 Anonymous, “Representante de EEUU insiste en sacar a Dominicana del CAFTA,” El Financiero, 
November 21, 2004. 
208 Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System (SICE), Trade Policy 
Developments: Central America-Dominican Republic-United States, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_CAFTA/USA_CAFTA_e.ASP (accessed May 31, 2009).  
 76
among many investors.  Even before that period, Arturo Peguero, President of the 
Dominican FTZ Association (ADOZONA), stated, “70% of new businesses that started 
the installation processes in the FTZ parks have suspended their operations until the 
impasse was overcome.”209  This lag most likely caused an undetermined amount of 
businesses and investors to shift their investments towards the CA countries that were 
prepared to take advantage of the new trade zone.  
 The DR and the U.S. had multiple issues after the corn syrup debate that needed 
to be resolved before the two nations were ready to enforce the agreement.  The initial 
delays were caused by the USTR’s questioning of the 2% tariff levied on all imported 
goods and the 13% monetary exchange commission that was being charged to conduct 
business using the DOP.  The latter two were resolved with relative ease as the 
government took the proper steps to remove them, but other problems would arise.  The 
next major concern involved a selective consumption tax on all imported vehicles for a 
period of 10 years, instead of the agreed 5-year limit set in the DR-CAFTA.  The USTR 
questioned the tax based on the limitations placed on 5-ton vehicles, and on the 
subjectivity used to enforce the tariff.  The consumption tax issue was resolved early in 
2007 when the DR Congress amended the fiscal resolution that included the 
stipulation.210  Some observers claimed that the Dominican government was attempting 
to seek concessions from the U.S. government in an attempt to protect local businesses, 
but the government did try to take a firm stance against Chevron Caribbean.211  This 
became one of the hardest issue to resolve and dealt with specific labor practices in the 
fuel transportation sector, which affected the application of Norm 148 put into practice by 
the DR Secretary of Commerce and Industry (SEIC).212 
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  The last hurdle for the DR was the dispute triggered when Chevron Caribbean, a 
long established firm in the DR, decided that as part of its optimization plan it would 
discontinue all local transportation contracts and replace them with their own fleet of 
carriers and drivers.  The decision by Chevron Caribbean caused the SEIC to issue two 
resolutions that regulated the domestic transportation of fuels within the DR.  These 
measures were appealed by Chevron Caribbean through the USTR, which was quick to 
claim that resolutions were not in accordance with the obligations assumed by the DR in 
the DR-CAFTA.  Yet the DR government stood firmly behind its position in making sure 
that Chevron Caribbean implemented its optimization plan in a gradual manner, which 
would help the laborers transition their services towards other enterprises.  In the end 
Chevron Caribbean agreed to accept a postponement in the implementation of its 
program until 2008, and introduce gradual measures that would not cause abrupt shock to 
the fuel transportation sector.213  In a further step, Chevron Caribbean went on to 
negotiate a settlement with the DR Autonomous Workers Union of Fuel Drivers and 
Associates in 2009.  The arrangement awarded the union DR$19 million in workers’ 
compensation pay, an agreement to contract a certain percentage of local drivers, and aid 
in helping to find discharged drivers employment in other companies.214  This step 
helped to demonstrate the importance of achieving and retaining partnerships that can 
help address the needs of all the parties involved.  It also went a long way to trying to 
develop and promote solutions to some of the social problems that will arise with trade 
liberalization.  
 With the enactment of the final two legal amendments that produced changes to 
Dominican Law in January of 2007 and the resolution of the transportation dispute in the 
following month, the DR was finally ready to implement the anticipated DR-CAFTA.  
The FTA went into force on the March 1, 2007, after years of negotiations and multiple 
delays.  Many FTZ industrialists had been impatiently waiting for the agreement to go 
into effect, especially since as their businesses were suffering through a major economic 
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downturn.  ADOZONA was a major proponent of the DR-CAFTA and had been calling 
for the immediate entry into force of the FTA as it saw many companies within the 
industrial complexes close.  Nationwide the maquiladoras had been experiencing major 
contractions and adjustment issues, and it was hoped the DR-CAFTA would alleviate 
many of the losses.  The question being asked was whether it was too late to combat the 
surging trend?  The DR government promised that it would enact laws to exempt FTZs 
from paying taxes on transfers of goods and services, corporate taxes, and custom tariffs 
in an effort to increase the levels of competitiveness from the enterprises. 215  Yet the 
government’s action really seemed more like a defensive tactic to combat the imminent 
conditions that the nation was facing.  What was more important to understand was what 
the DR expected to gain and lose in the long term by joining the FTA and what would be 
the challenges in achieving the desired results.  
D. EXPECTED GAINS AND LOSSES  
In the DR and the rest of the CA nations there was much debate surrounding the 
gains and losses revolving around the DR-CAFTA.  Many analysts used their own 
subjective formulas to dissect the ramifications for the DR in the long term.  Hornbeck 
concludes that the primary gain that drove the DR’s decision was the reduction in barriers 
to the U.S. market, especially for textile and agricultural products.216  The author feels 
that access was cause enough, and it is certainly true that the future of the textile and 
apparel component was a major part of the decision.  But in looking at all the evidence 
Jesus de los Santos, DR National Competitive Council (NCC), captured the essence of 
the argument when he said, “DR-CAFTA is not a solution, but it’s a tool we can use for 
the benefit of the DR.  If we can’t provide the proper trade and legal environment, then 
we won’t see the benefits.  DR-CAFTA gives us the opportunity to do things right.”217  
The DR-CAFTA was not meant to be the universal remedy that would solve for the DR’s 
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problems, but it did provide the country a larger space that could help it develop many of 
the nation’s sectors.  It was certainly true that the DR could achieve its desired goals 
through the FTA, but only if the nation, as a whole, undertook all the necessary steps and 
adjustments needed.  The country was running in a global race, where it needed to retain 
and explore new venues that would help it maintain its competitive advantages.  The fact 
that the DR was one of the last signatories of FTA put it a position where it had to halt 
any further momentum that was taking businesses away to other countries, including its 
new CA partners.  
 The DR wanted to keep its established opportunities opened, and by entering the 
DR-CAFTA it took away the conditionality involved under the CBI relationship.  Under 
the DR-CAFTA there was no possibility that the DR would lose the preferential 
treatment status assigned to its products and services.  Since the FTA rules were set and 
codified, this created an environment of increase stability for both domestic and foreign 
investors.218  For the DR, the importance of long-term stability was deemed necessary to 
encourage and promote increases in FDI, which under the maquiladora relationship had 
helped to fuel its export driven development strategy.219  A constant increase in FDI was 
one of the largest opportunities that the DR was hoping to capture through the DR-
CAFTA.  It was expected that FDI from the U.S. and other DR-CAFTA nations would 
increase once all the protections and incentives provided by the regime were established.  
With the new influx of FDI, a certain level of confidence could be established that would 
prevent many companies from closing down their operations and setting up their shops in 
China.220  Mr. Ortega, a DR official, claimed that the government was definitely 
optimistic about the new prospects and affirmed, “DR-CAFTA will make access to the 
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U.S. market permanent and give us the tool to confront all the challenges we are facing 
with the growth of China’s exports, particularly to the U.S.”221 
 The DR wanted to provide a positive investment environment that would attract 
FDI, but in order to create that possibility it had to take on significant institutional 
reforms to change the way investors perceived the nation.  Although the DR-CAFTA 
specifically required certain reforms that were made through changes in laws, the nation 
could no longer afford to stall on their implementation and expect to remain 
competitive.222  Institutional changes are considered both a gain and a challenge for the 
nation.  The country has had a reputation for dubious dealings in the past, but with the 
new laws enacted, there is a clear obligation to adhere to transparent and corrupt free 
practices.223  One of the areas where the DR government had to make significant changes 
concerned the rules that determined government procurement practices.  Under the new 
framework public bidding is mandatory for the acquisition of services that exceed certain 
threshold limits as delineated in the DR-CAFTA charter.  The latter introduces the 
possibility of having international proposals competing with local offers, which will help 
fight a perennial source of mismanagement and corruption.224   
 The institutional reforms enacted to revamp the banking system and the 
subsequent results paid major dividends towards paving the way for new sources of FDI.  
For the DR, the rapid recovery from the 2003-2004 banking crisis has translated into 
higher levels of private consumption and investments.  Vincente Bengoa, DR Finance 
Minister, reported that in 2006, private investment grew 20%, while private consumption 
increased an average rate of 10.7 % during the 2004-2006 period.225  The investment and 
consumption increases would not have been made possible if it were not for the IMF 
required changes to the laws and procedures that included supervision and audits.  The 
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new regulatory framework and the restructuring of the supervisory body has led to 
increased compliance costs, but has helped to restore confidence for foreign and domestic 
investors.  Juan Jose Arteaga, Vice-president of Grupo Progresso, believes that the 
positive investment environment will attract more foreign banks to the DR, and that 
nation is willing to accept the challenges of international practices such as mergers and 
acquisitions, which have never been part of the DR’s banking history.226  With the 
institutional reforms set in place and the enforcement of the DR-CAFTA in effect, the 
nation is expected to progress into a new era of development and growth.  
 There are other areas in which the DR will have to make institutional changes to 
attract FDI, but the increased FDI is a means towards a greater end.  The DR is expecting 
that the DR-CAFTA and the new FDI will create jobs and help reduce the high levels of 
poverty and the major migration problem that continuously concerns Dominican 
citizens.227  These problems have been an integral part of the country’s history, and many 
governments have failed to make substantial strides in containing the correlated issues.  
One of the ways that new jobs can be created is by having industries become integrated 
“vertically backwards.”  This simply translates to having more companies in the DR 
becoming involved in the intermediate phases of production.  One of the downsides to the 
maquiladora set up is that there is little value added to the end products.  Many of the 
DR’s exports fell under this scenario since all that was required in the local factories was 
the final step of assembly.  Companies and firms will now have the ability to shift more 
of the phases of production to the DR, since according to Bengoa, “this [shift] wasn’t 
feasible within such a small market as the DR’s alone, but it is now that we’ll have free 
access to the U.S. market.”228  The increase in production in exportable and domestically 
consumed goods and services will help to generate more productive employment 
prospects for Dominicans.  The FDI is also expected to be vectored towards other 
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important national sectors other than the exports, such as technology, agriculture, science 
and other activities that will ensure the profitability and security of investments.229   
As the DR-CAFTA starts to take it effects on the DR economy, consumers and 
exporters are expected to attain significant gains.  Consumers are expected to see an 
increased variety and quality of domestic and foreign products and services due to the 
increased availability created in the larger trading space.  The latter will be combined 
with lower prices as Dominican products and services will begin to compete with the 
foreign alternatives.  With the enlarged market, exporters will have the opportunity to 
significantly improve the quality of products designed for exportation, while taking 
advantage of the nation’s comparative advantages.  The increased quality demands will 
help Dominican exporters satisfy the demands of the larger international market.  Finally, 
the DR will be able to take advantage of economy of scales, since it will be in a position 
to overcome the limitations imposed by the much smaller domestic market.  With the 
new trade area, which will be devoid of the previous tariffs and restrictions, many 
Dominican companies will have the ability to market and sell their goods on a much 
larger spectrum and scale.230  
 All of the mentioned gains are based on opportunities that are highly dependant 
on the will of the entire nation in taking the initiative.  What is certain is that there are 
going to be tangible and definitive losses incurred by the DR.  One of  the largest losses 
associated with the liberalization process was tied to the elimination of tariffs.  The DR’s 
economy was under considerable restrictions as it climbed out of the 2003-2004 crisis, 
and the government will have to continue to measure its policies as the expected losses of 
tariff revenues would put further strains on the nation’s treasury.231  For the DR 
government, the two major components that were eliminated were the 13% monetary 
exchange commission and the 2% tariff levied on all imported goods.  As mentioned 
before, the removal of the tariffs was a prerequisite condition to allow the DR to enter 
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into the FTA, and there was no way to get around it.  At the time the exchange rate tax 
was the government’s third largest income source and together with the general tariff 
they generated US$900 million, which was equivalent to 3% of the DR’s GDP.  This was 
a substantial amount of money that the DR government would have to try to make up, 
and it was looking at the possibility of implementing a value added tax (VAT).232  The 
logical problem with the VAT is that due to its nature it would offset the gains made 
through competitive price reduction, and its revenues would fluctuate with the amount of 
domestic consumption.  
 Another area of major losses for the DR will be in the agricultural and livestock 
sector.  The DR’s agriculture is expected to be seriously challenged by the DR-CAFTA, 
although as previously mentioned there are specific provisions and phased timelines in 
the agreement that provide protection for staple products.233  The protections will be 
scaled down over a 20 year period, but there is no way to escape the fact that certain 
subsectors will be eliminated at the end of the process.  The DR’s agricultural and 
livestock sectors have traditionally been small and technologically limited, and in the past 
have not had to compete with foreign imports.  They usually catered to a small market, 
and with the opening of the market will not be able to take advantage of economies of 
scale.234  For the DR the major issue is that the U.S. agricultural sector receives subsidies 
and is so immense that there is no possibility that DR farmers will be able to compete.  
The agricultural and livestock sectors will have to result to substantial repositioning, 
which will led it down the path of searching for niche markets.235  
 The search for niche markets is not a new concept for DR, which started to 
develop nontraditional exports when the CBI was originally introduced in the 1980s.  The 
20-year phased schedule for agricultural products and livestock was specifically designed 
to allow the DR-CAFTA countries to diversify towards nontraditional exports and away 
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from subsistence agriculture and textile manufacturing, as part of a strategy of 
diversification and development.236  Fortunately for the DR, during President 
Fernández’s first term in office, national leaders from the government and business sector 
came together to form a strategic partnership, the NCC.  This group was formed to 
address the issues of competitiveness in the emerging global trading environment.  The 
NCC understood that the DR would be facing constant pressures as its economy became 
more integrated in the global market, and it looked for ways different ways to strengthen 
the DR’s capacity to take advantage of new market access opportunities.  The NCC 
played an active role during the DR-CAFTA negotiations, and specifically targeted the 
agro-industry sector.  The partnership formulated plans to help shift the agricultural and 
livestock sector by establishing agricultural clusters that provided the proper technical 
assistance to address issues not covered under the CBI.  A major part of the process was 
to make sure that Dominican produce was meeting international standards, such as the 
proper sanitary, phyto-sanitary, and safety conditions.  The NCC is focused on 
developing niche markets, where the country can compete with high value added 
products, like organic products.237   
 With a new focus placed on this repackaged form of development, the DR has 
aggressively taken the proper steps to capitalize on the new economic openings.  While 
the NCC has been highly influential, the growth in niche markets has also been spurred 
by the DR government’s partnership with the Dominican Agrarian Institute (IAD), the 
Banco Agricola (Agricultural Bank), and the Reforma Agraria (Agrarian Reform 
Association).  The institutions have expended substantial energy in building up the DR’s 
capacity to produce a wide range of nontraditional crops, which are grown in controlled 
environments such as greenhouses.  In 2007, the DR had 300 greenhouses that were 
producing sweet peppers, cherry tomatoes, cucumbers, and other varieties of specialized 
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fruits and vegetables.  The destiny of a good part of the produce was intended to meet the 
demands of the American and European markets, and the DR had a plan to increase the 
land used for the new enterprises by 30% in 2008.238   
Although the majority of nontraditional exports are targeting large markets, the 
DR is also establishing venues to use the DR-CAFTA and the DR-CARICOM FTA to 
export items, such as organic garlic, to CA, Puerto Rico, and the smaller Caribbean 
islands.  The latter countries have large tourism sectors that create a demand for such 
products, and the DR is in a position to capture a good part of that market.239  The DR 
government has facilitated the new industry by opening up the path for traditional 
producers to become competitive exporters.  The IAD, working with the government, has 
been quick to determine what exports are competitive, while Banco Agricola is providing 
the needed loans to launch the transformation.  In total, the DR has seen the initial 
success of the changes on a small scale, and it poised to gain a larger share of the 
specialized markets.  As Salvador Jimenez, the Secretary of Agriculture, assured 
reporters, “the production of nontraditional exports in controlled environments is the FTZ 
of the future…although we are currently using 1.2 million square meters for production, 
our goal is reach 1.8 million square meters.”240 
E. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
The DR has the potential and the ability to take full advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the DR-CAFTA, but they will have to address and confront several challenges 
in order to attain the maximum effects possible.  In looking at all the challenges that must 
be addressed, managing the high expectations that have been advertised through the 
agreement will possibly be the hardest issue the DR government will have to face.  There 
are many people expecting an explosion of jobs to surge into the country, and after years 
                                                 
238 Modesto Rodriguez, “Ven en plasticultura futuro para sector agrícola criollo,” Listín Diario, 
August 31, 2007, http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=26672 (accessed June 3, 2009). 
239 Modesto Rodriguez, “Constanza se prepara para exportar vegetales al Caribe,” Listín Diario, 
April, 21, 2007, http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=10190 (accessed June 2, 2009).  
240 Modesto Rodriguez, “Ven en plasticultura futuro para sector agrícola criollo,” Listín Diario, 
August 31, 2007, http://www.listin.com.do/app/article.aspx?id=26672 (accessed June 3, 2009).  
 86
to hearing promises, Dominican citizens will have little tolerance for mediocre results.241  
The DR is expecting to grow and attract more investments, but the nation’s key sectors 
need to come together to provide a collective strategy to deal with issues that will arise.  
The latter was a specific issue that David Díaz Benavides, a renowned international 
consultant, addressed in the Listín Diario’s Globalization Conference in the summer of 
2007.  Díaz Benavidez stated that the first effect that the DR would experience under the 
DR-CAFTA is an increase in the amount of investments in the country, which would 
only be distributed effectively and evenly across the many sectors of the economy if the 
nation has a defined strategy on how to channel the benefits.  At the time the DR lacked 
what Díaz Benavidez called a “skyscraper approach.”  The latter developmental strategy 
that focuses on each economic sector and sets priorities and plans throughout the major 
areas.  The emphasis of the plan places importance on correcting the issues that will 
occur once cheaper foreign imports replaced domestic products, and how to help 
domestic producers competitive under the new circumstances.242  For the DR it would be 
important to maintain a clear focus that would allow it to foresee potential issues and 
concerns in order to adjust accordingly.  Lack of a plan will continue to put the nation in 
a reactionary mode that is continuously attempting to catch up the dynamic and 
unforgiving circumstances.  
 As the DR marches down the roads towards more open trade, it will be extremely 
important that it invests considerable efforts towards the development of human capital.  
Increased attention on educational programs that will provide a smarter workforce is a 
necessary component that needs to be addressed if the nation is going to maintain 
sustainable growth.  The DR government has initiated plans that will ensure that state 
schooling is provided for all children starting at the age of five.  One educational program 
that was implemented required the hiring of 1900 teachers to provide schooling for an 
additional 40,000 children that until 2007 were outside of the educational system.  The 
DR Education Secretary, Alejandrina German, stated that “we are well aware of our 
commitment to guarantee that by 2015, all 15 year old children will have at least nine 
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years of top quality education.”243  There is general acknowledgement that education is 
the key to the nation’s ability to attain economic and social development, but the realty is 
that only small sectors of Dominican society have access to the form of schooling that 
opens the door to top-tier jobs.  This lack of accessibility towards high quality and 
bilingual jobs could hold the nation back as it continues to become more involved in 
global trade.244   
 Even at lower educational levels it will be important to have a capable workforce 
that will be able to take advantages of different types and levels of production.  Costa 
Rica provides a great example of the benefits achieved by having an educated workforce 
that can work in the high technology and semi-conductor industries.  Costa Rica was able 
to attract an Intel computer chip assembly and testing plant that alone brought US$500 
million in FDI to the country during the 1990s.  This plant was the first Intel venture in 
Latin America, whose contract was won over Mexico due to the nation’s overall 
competitiveness, wage rates, and qualified labor.245  The plant was letter augmented in 
2003 by a US$110 million injection that helped the nation expand its enterprises in 
chipsets for personal computers.  Costa Rica has also taken the lead in the production of 
optical and medical equipment and other types of machinery, which has helped it to 
become the fastest growing and most diversified trader of CA.246  Costa Rica’s success in 
diversification is partly due to the fact that its educated workforce was able to provide the 
needed level of labor required and develop a distinct competitive advantage.  The latter is 
a pattern that the DR can use as blueprint as its economy continues to diversify and 
expand.  
 The DR will also have to take serious steps to resolve the problems associated with 
the country’s mediocre infrastructure and routine power outages.  As expected trade starts 
to grow, it will be extremely important for the DR to have the adequate roads, 
                                                 
243 Jules Stewart, “Dominican Republic-Recovery Efforts Come to Fruition,” The Banker, September 
1, 2007.  
244 Ibid.  
245 Erika Morphy, “Dominican Republic: US trade-One by One,” Foreign Direct Investment, 
December 2005. 
246 J.F. Hornbeck, U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, The Dominican Republic-
Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), July 6, 2005, 14. 
 88
transportation systems, airports, and seaports to move commodity products around in an 
efficient and reliable manner.  This is an aspect that needs to be dealt with consistently if 
the DR is going to reap the maximum benefits.247  In 2007, President Fernández, 
acknowledged that although the DR had one of the most developed infrastructures in the 
Caribbean region, there were still many things that needed further work.  In the last 
decade, the nation has worked significantly to improve and expand its airport network 
and established the $300 million Caucedo megaport facility, one of the largest seaports in 
the Caribbean located due east of Santo Domingo, the nation’s capital.  The nation has 
also worked on modernizing and expanding the port facilities in San Pedro de Macoris, 
Puerto Plata, and Montecristi that will be used to facilitate greater volumes of cargo as 
well as tourism.248 
 What has been encouraging is that although the DR is working hard to fix the 
infrastructure problems, the DR government is not alone in taking on the burden of fixing 
the issues.  New laws enacted in the DR allow more public-private partnerships to help 
provide the needed changes.  Through the Infrastructure Projects Law, foreign and 
domestic investors are invited to help and finance many projects, such as the building of 
roads and the installation of potable water pipelines, especially in the marginalized areas 
of the nation.249  This is a good step for the DR, since it brings together many different 
sectors of the country, and allows them to take ownership and vested interest in the 
development of the country.  Yet the largest problem by far that the nation is confronting 
revolves are around the issue of electricity supply.  In the DR, electricity is a service that 
costs 21 cents per kilowatt, while electricity in CA runs on an average of 10 cents, and 
the provision of the service can be quite unreliable.  Many regard this issue as one of the 
key impediments to new business and what makes the DR less attractive than its CA 
counterparts.250   
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 The DR realizes this is a major problem and is trying to contain the problem on 
multiple fronts.  The government is driving the effort by constructing two 600 megawatt 
power plants that will be in line by 2009, and developing different hydroelectric plants to 
provide the DR with an additional 290 megawatts of power.251  In a further effort to 
diversify the entire generation system, which is currently petroleum based, the DR is 
using hydroelectric dams, imported coal, and natural gas.  At the same time, the DR 
government is working hard to encourage the use of ethanol, wind, and solar energy to 
contain the enduring problem.252  The private sector has also taken on important 
investments in trying to diversify its energy sources by using ethanol and constructing 
carbon burning plants.253  These are positive steps in the right direction that will help the 
nation establish the needed environment to attract the highly desired FDI, especially from 
U.S. firms that will demand a high level of reliability in necessary inputs of production. 
 Another challenge that the DR will have to deal with will be making sure that the 
firms involved in manufacturing maintain their competitive edge by investing in modern 
equipment.  China will maintain a relative advantage in certain areas, in part due to their 
better and newer production equipment.  The DR can remain competitive due to its 
location and access to the U.S. market by keeping up with more efficient and updated 
methods of production.254  Other areas that will help the DR’s transition will be the 
following: assuring access to updated global services such as telecommunications, data 
networks, and insurance; facilitating lines of credit, especially for developing sectors; 
promoting and expanding commerce and investments, especially when they develop 
strategic partnerships; and developing policies that allow increased access to knowledge 
and innovation.255   
 All of the adjustments will not be easy for the DR, but what is evident is that there 
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is no turning back on this new venture.  Fortunately for the DR, President Fernández has 
been able to get backing from the Congress and many national sectors in order to guide 
the nation down the correct path.  What will be important is that future Dominican 
leaders continue to attack the challenges collectively to ensure that the nation is in a 
position to take full advantage of new opportunities.  In the new and competitive trading 
space it will be more important than ever to keep up with the demand of free trade or 
those same prospects will easily shift to other nations, including the other DR-CAFTA 
nations. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The reasons that led the DR to join the DR-CAFTA have to be attributed to a 
convergence of multiple factors.  During the 1980s the country faced an overwhelming 
economic crisis that forced the nation to take austere economic measures in order to 
receive help from the IMF.  The economic restructuring, which began to liberalize trade 
and open the nation’s market, was accompanied with an alternative development strategy 
that the U.S. presented through the CBI.  The CBI specifically attempted to change the 
Caribbean Basin’s economic growth model by giving the beneficiaries the opportunity to 
export nontraditional goods towards the U.S. market.  These first two factors initiated the 
transformation of the Dominican economy away from its dependence on primary exports 
towards light manufacturing and tourism.  As the global trend to shift labor intensive jobs 
to low wage regions started, the DR was willing and able to take advantage of the CBI 
and become a global platform in the apparel and light manufacturing industries.  In the 
DR, the majority of the export processing industries were able to take advantage of the 
highly promoted FTZ parks that were built throughout the island-nation.  The growth in 
the export sector quickly changed the country to the point where the DR became one of 
the global leaders in apparel exportation by the end of the 1980s.  This first 
transformation was the initial catalyst, which would eventually vector the DR towards 
seeking entry into the DR-CAFTA. 
 During the 1990s the DR continued to grow as reforms were taken to connect the 
country’s trade to larger trading entities within the region.  The process of Western 
Hemisphere regionalization helped to foster an environment of trade liberalization and 
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open markets, while it provided new opportunities for the DR.  The DR experienced 
impressive growth throughout the entire decade, but it also started to feel the effects and 
demands of regional and global competition.  The NAFTA was the first major test for the 
DR and the other CBI recipients, and the newly formed trading bloc forced the Caribbean 
nations to take defensive actions to prevent businesses from shifting their operations.  At 
the same time, the FTAA initiative introduced the entire hemisphere to the hope of 
creating an economic zone that would allow the unrestrained flow of goods and services.  
The initiative was to be enacted in one entire effort, and it was perceived that smaller 
trading blocs within the space could form the foundations of the colossal endeavor.  For 
the smaller hemispheric countries like the DR, it became important to hold on to their 
established markets and many nations decided to look for strategic partnerships with each 
other to counteract the global pressures that were effecting their export led growth.  
Organizations such as the CACM and CARICOM became crucial entities within the 
Caribbean Basin that tried to integrate the nations, which had similar endowments.  By 
reducing competition with each other, the nations hoped to exploit economies of scale 
and develop strategies that would help development in a united fashion. 
 The DR was geographically and economically in a position to act as the connecting 
bridge for trade in the Caribbean Basin.  By establishing FTAs with both the CACM and 
the CARICOM, the DR hoped to act as the bonding agent that would connect the smaller 
islands of the Caribbean to the Spanish speaking nations of CA.  This subregionalization 
posturing by the DR was undertaken in the framework of the FTAA initiative, but also in 
a collective stance to counter the fierce economic rivalry that was emerging from China 
and the rest of Asia.  The CBI continued to be the main vehicle that the DR used to send 
the majority of its exports to the U.S., and the importance of maintaining that market 
outlet open drove it to seek an FTA with its main trading partner.  For the DR the reliance 
on the U.S. market was even greater than its CA counterparts, and the lack of permanence 
of the periodically reviewed CBI put the DR in a vulnerable position.  In 2003 just before 
the DR began to negotiate the U.S.-DR FTA, 85% of its exports were absorbed by the 
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American market, while the DR imported 49% from the U.S.256  Thus, there was a sense 
of urgency for the DR to attain a FTA with the U.S., especially since other nations like 
the CACM members had initiated similar moves under the framework of the FTAA 
initiative.  If the DR had not attempted to do so, it would have easily lost a greater share 
of the U.S. market to the CA nations, which had similar economic endowments and 
would have attained increased preferential treatment for their products and services.  But 
the larger threat that complicated matters was the termination of global textile and 
apparel quotas in 2005 and the continued encroachment of Asian products on the U.S. 
market. This situation forced the U.S., DR, and the CA nations to look towards 
establishing a permanent strategic partnership to prevent further losses and maintain 
growth.  
 For the DR, the convergence of its economic transformation, the FTAA initiative, 
and pressures from global competition all came together to guide the nation towards the 
road of establishing a FTA with its CA neighbors and most importantly with its main 
trading partner, the U.S.  The DR came to the conclusion that the opportunities or 
potential gains outweighed the losses or changes the nation would have to undergo in the 
process.  Throughout the negotiation and initial implementation phase, the leaders of the 
DR had to deal with some of the adjustment costs that need to be absorbed in order to 
enter into the agreement.  What is important to emphasize is that in the new and 
challenging global climate, the DR’s potential can only be obtained if the nation develops 
and implements a sound strategy on how all the national sectors can advance and adjust 
during this new transformational stage.  The country’s desire to maintain and attract 
increased sources of FDI and to sustain it export driven economy appears to be the 
number one goal the DR wished to achieve.  The FDI was the key component to 
increasing business, and also acts as the fuel that also helped drive many of the other 
national sectors.  The FDI will be extremely important for the nation, but the DR has a 
fair amount of challenges that have already surfaced and will continue to arise before the 
FTA is completely in place.  What will prove to be beneficial in facing the challenges is 
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that the DR government and private sector continue to establish partnerships that help to 
contain and reduce the problems that will crop up.  So far this has proven to be a good 
formula that has helped to create a sense of ownership in combating the problems that 
could stall the development of the nation.  
 The DR-CAFTA went into force in the DR on the March 1, 2007, and so far the 
overall results have been mixed.  The DR was able to post an impressive 8.47% growth in 
GDP for 2007, which was actually down from the record 10.67% growth experienced 
during 2006.257  But the respectable growth did not hide the fact that certain key figures 
that were expected to see growth under the DR-CAFTA had actually decreased.  The first 
negative indicator was that the nation continued to experience a decrease in total exports.  
The decrease in total exports was becoming a disturbing trend for the nation that had seen 
a 4% drop in total exports during 2006 and a 7% drop in 2007.  The apparel and textile 
industries in the FTZs suffered significant contractions in 2006 with a 17% drop in 
exports due to the appreciation of the DOP, increased Asian competition, and a 
government mandated increase in salaries.258  Economists in the DR were particularly 
shocked when it was revealed that the trading balance between the U.S. and the DR 
increased to a negative 150%, while the overall volume of trade remained the same.  
Many Dominican leaders were expecting that the DR-CAFTA would increase the 
nation’s volume of trade, and that the DR would become a net exporter in terms of 
overall value.  When the DR, compared itself to El Salvador, which had increased exports 
by 11%, Nicaragua and Honduras with increases of 5%, and Guatemala with a decrease 
of 2% during 2007, it realized that it was the nation with the worse overall 
performance.259 
 The disappointment of the first year results was of significant concern, and several 
analysts tied to find the reasons why the DR had done so poorly.  Fernando Capellán, 
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President of ADOZONA, pointed out that certain rules that were supposed to be removed 
by the DR-CAFTA in the textile and apparel industry have not allowed the DR’s FTZs to 
a take full advantage of the agreement.  Specifically, Capellán pointed out to several rules 
of textile accumulation, which clarify the composition percentage of each export to be 
considered a product from the region, and thus tariff free.  Some of these rules that 
regulated the potential textile exports had not been resolved by the USTR and U.S. 
Congress in 2007, and according to Capellán they were hurting Dominican export firms.  
Capellán stated, “Basically the industry has not made great strides in DR-CAFTA, due to 
those problems that we face in Washington.  The protectionism that currently exists has 
blocked some of our strong initiatives.”260   
 In a different analysis, Robert Fannin, U.S. Ambassador to the DR, claimed that the 
DR’s poor performance could be attributed to the fact that the laws, norms, and 
resolutions related to the DR-CAFTA’s implementation have not been applied 
universally across many areas.  According to Fannin, the agreement has brought about 
what it had promised, which was an increase in FDI and exports.261  Unfortunately, the 
latter statement contradicts the results reported in several sources including the Inter-
American Development Bank, which reported an investment growth decline from 
21.33% to 12.49% between 2006 and 2007 and an overall trade balance hovering around 
-21% for the same period.262  The negative indicators could have been part of the initial 
adjustment period, and since the other nations had enforced the FTA a year earlier, they 
had overcome the preliminary phase.  Statistics for the 2008 are harder to interpret due to 
the global economic downturn, yet despite the downward trend the DR’s GDP grew at 
5.26%. 263  
 Although there are several negative indicators that the DR will have to deal with, 
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there are sources and optimists that point out that the DR’s economy has started to shift 
or transform one more time.  While the DR continues to lose textile and apparel jobs to 
Asia and CA, other export firms in the FTZs specializing in the tobacco, jewelry, 
medical, electronics, plastic goods, and pharmaceutical sectors have all reported increases 
during the last few years.264  This new shift accompanied by growth has helped to offset 
the losses in the textile and apparel industries, and appears to be a natural outgrowth of 
trade liberalization and the open markets’ ability to shift production towards areas were 
efficiencies can be exploited.  
 President Fernández and Finance Minister Bengoa both acknowledge that a 
transformation in the DR is underway, and they have taken positive steps to aid in the 
conversion process.  One of the key ways the DR government is contributing to the 
change is by incorporating small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and individual 
entrepreneurs into the new economic environment through a program called Promipyne.  
The plan not only incorporates SMEs into the bigger trade picture, but it also helps to 
stimulate labor by providing micro-financing, especially in economically marginalized 
areas.265  What is clear is that the DR will need to come up with creative solutions, 
especially as the FTZ industrial model comes to a close for certain sectors of the 
economy.  The promotion of the SMEs is an example of how the business concept must 
change in order to face global competition.266  It is also important to see that the shift is 
toward the production of items that require higher levels of education and specialization.  
It is hoped that the decline of certain less efficient sectors will help pave the path for 
more sophisticated growth and expansion.  
 The new transformation will need support from many other sectors of Dominican 
society as the nation continues to diversify its economy.  The overreliance on any one or 
small group of industries can prevent development, and the DR-CAFTA will provide the 
opportunities for the DR to continue to integrate itself further into the region and globe.  
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The success or failure of the DR-CAFTA will depend on the way that the DR manages 
the implementation and will have ramifications for a long time to come.  The DR-
CAFTA is not an agreement that the member nations can afford to try to undercut or 
work around.  It will be important for the DR to taken the proper steps to help its 
implementation, or the nation will pay the price of potential isolation and 
marginalization.  The hope is that the DR-CAFTA will help the DR achieve a greater 
level of stability and economic interdependence in the long run, which in turn will help it 
deal with its other increasing problems such as internal security, drug trafficking, 
increased violence levels, migration, and economic inequality.  The DR has adjusted to 
changing circumstances in the past, and its leadership has the ability and willingness to 
continue to take the necessary steps to help the country advance in the ever competitive 
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